Emergency Diesel-Electric Generator Set Maintenance and Test Periodicity by Fehr, Stephen John
Old Dominion University 
ODU Digital Commons 
Engineering Management & Systems 
Engineering Theses & Dissertations 
Engineering Management & Systems 
Engineering 
Fall 2017 
Emergency Diesel-Electric Generator Set Maintenance and Test 
Periodicity 
Stephen John Fehr 
Old Dominion University, sfehr@odu.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/emse_etds 
 Part of the Operational Research Commons, and the Statistics and Probability Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Fehr, Stephen J.. "Emergency Diesel-Electric Generator Set Maintenance and Test Periodicity" (2017). 
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD), Dissertation, Engineering Management & Systems Engineering, Old Dominion 
University, DOI: 10.25777/q2nk-n411 
https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/emse_etds/24 
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Engineering Management & Systems 
Engineering at ODU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Engineering Management & Systems 
Engineering Theses & Dissertations by an authorized administrator of ODU Digital Commons. For more information, 
please contact digitalcommons@odu.edu. 
EMERGENCY DIESEL-ELECTRIC GENERATOR SET 
 




Stephen John Fehr 
M.S. December 2014, Old Dominion University 
B.S. December 1997, Pennsylvania State University 
 
A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of  
Old Dominion University in Partial Fulfillment of the  
Requirements for the Degree of 
 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
ENGINEERING MANAGEMENT AND SYSTEMS ENGINEERING 
 








T. Steven Cotter (Director) 
 
Holly Handley (Member) 
 
Jennifer Michaeli (Member) 
 
Cesar Pinto (Member) 
 







EMERGENCY DIESEL-ELECTRIC GENERATOR SET 
MAINTENANCE AND TEST PERIODICITY 
 
Stephen John Fehr 
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Director: Dr. T. Steven Cotter 
 
Manufacturer and industry recommendations vary considerably for maintenance and tests 
of emergency diesel-electric generator sets in emergency standby duty. There is little consistency 
among generator sets of similar technology, and manufacturers and their representatives often 
provide contradictory guidance. As a result, periodicity of emergency diesel-electric generator 
set maintenance and tests varies considerably in practice. Utilizing the framework proposed and 
tested by Fehr (2014), this research developed a parametric regression survival model of the 
reliability of modern diesel-electric generator sets in emergency standby duty as a function of 
maintenance, age, and cumulative run hours. A survival regression technique leveraging Cox’s 
(1972) methods was developed to combine multiple exponential and Weibull (1951) 
distributions into a single model to represent emergency diesel-electric generator sets and other 
complex machinery exhibiting multiple independent failure distributions. A generalized model 
and reliability tables derived from that model are presented along with maintenance and test 
recommendations to assist managers in determining the optimal maintenance program for a 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Emergency power systems based on packaged emergency diesel-electric generator sets, 
referred to herein as generator sets, are installed at facilities where a loss of utility power would 
result in an unacceptable impact to operational capability or present a risk to life or safety. These 
generator sets are typically configured to start automatically upon electrical utility failure and 
assume essential facility loads until utility power was restored. Although emergency generator 
sets in areas with exceptionally poor quality electrical utility power may run 200 hours or more 
per year, emergency generator sets in areas with very stable utility power may not run 
operationally at all in a given year. This represents a significant departure from continuous duty 
applications for which the diesel engines in these generator sets were typically designed. Such 
structural variability in operational demand also creates challenges in determining optimal 
maintenance and test periodicity of critical equipment with high reliability requirements. 
Maintenance and test recommendations National in Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 
publications NFPA 70B (2016) and NFPA 110 (2016) represent the standard for power 
component and emergency diesel-electric generator set maintenance. These document series 
were referenced by Department of Defense guidance in Joint Departments of the Army, the 
Navy, and the Air Force Technical Manual TM 5-683 (1995) Facilities Engineering Electrical 
Interior Facilities and by the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE) commercial 
recommendations (IEEE 3007.2-2010). These documents also included non-specific statements 
to follow manufacturer recommendations. Standards for recommended preventative maintenance 
have changed little in past revisions of NFPA 70B and NFPA 110 and are largely based on 





2009; IEEE 493-2007). However, in practice, recommendations for periodicity of maintenance 
and testing of emergency diesel generator systems differ significantly between organizations, 
publications, and manufacturers of similar technology systems. Recommendations have even 
varied between individual manufacturer representatives and publications for a specific model 
generator set. While manufacturers are often the most knowledgeable about the design of their 
own equipment, manufacturers’ abilities to conduct robust long-term failure modes and effects 
analyses on fielded units have been limited, and manufacturer maintenance recommendations 
have often been highly speculative (Moubray, 1997). The result has been inconsistent 
maintenance and test practices on similar systems. This inconsistency provided an opportunity to 
quantitatively determine the empirical impact of historic maintenance practices on emergency 
diesel-electric generator system reliability.   
 
PURPOSE 
The purpose of this research was to develop a general model for determining the 
reliability and optimal test and maintenance periodicities for emergency diesel-electric generator 
sets supporting critical operations facilities and other facilities requiring highly reliable 
emergency power. Per NFPA 70 (2017), critical operations power systems facilities encompass 
Department of Homeland Security and Department of Defense command, control and 
communication centers, as well as hospitals, police stations, and fire stations. These facilities 
required the highest levels of readiness, with expectations of one hundred percent mission 
availability driving power availability requirements in excess of 99.9999% (JIE Operations 
Sponsor Group, 2014). Such high availability requirements push the limit of what is possible 





The emergency power systems that support these facilities have to maintain the highest levels of 
reliability and availability to meet mission availability requirements while still minimizing 
unnecessary costs.   
This research and the new modeling methods developed for it were intended to provide 
managers the qualitative data needed to confidently optimize the staffing level, and generator set 
maintenance plan for each facility. This research was intended to also allow managers to more 
accurately calculate power system reliability as a function of not only design, but also 
maintenance. This would give managers flexibility to consider installation design with long-term 
maintenance plans to achieve reliability goals.   
This research was supported by the United States Navy in close cooperation with Old 
Dominion University. This research was intended to guide future policy for test and maintenance 
periodicity for United States Navy emergency diesel-electric generator systems and to permit the 
update of maintenance practices in NFPA 110 (2016) and engineering data in TM 5-968-5 
(2006), NFPA 70B (2016), and IEEE 493-2007 (2007). The views expressed herein do not 
necessarily represent the views of the United States Navy or Old Dominion University. 
 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
This research sought to produce new knowledge to answer a series of questions defining 
the relationship between emergency diesel-electric generator set maintenance, tests, and other 
properties that may impact reliability. These relationships were modeled mathematically in 
regression Equation 1, with a descriptive list of database and regression variables in Table 1. As 
the high reliability of emergency diesel-electric generator sets resulted in a low-occurrence rate 





intervals would result in a high risk of Type II errors rejecting valid predictors. Therefore, a 
significance level of α ≤ 0.10 was chosen for a confidence interval of 90% for hypothesis testing. 
The associated risk of Type I errors was considered when analyzing and interpreting results. 
 
logℎ({𝑡, 𝑛𝑠, 𝑇𝑟𝑡}|𝑥𝑖)











+ 𝛽𝑚𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑀𝑎𝑘𝑒 + 𝛽𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 + 𝛽𝑘𝑊𝑘𝑊
+ 𝛽𝑎𝑔𝑒log⁡(𝑇𝑎𝑔𝑒) + 𝛽𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑣𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑇𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑣) + 𝛽𝐿𝑥𝐿 + 𝛽𝑠𝑟𝑐𝑥𝑠𝑟𝑐 + 𝜀 
(1) 
 
Primary research question: What is the relationship between emergency diesel-electric 
generator set reliability and maintenance, test periodicity, training, make, model, size, 
age, run time, and load? 
Null Hypothesis Ho0: Maintenance periodicity, test periodicity, training, make, model, 
size, age, run time, and load have no impact on generator set reliability.  
Ho0: β1=β2=… β22=β0,1=β0,2=…β21,22=βmake=βmodel=βkW=βage=βrtfv=βL=0, α ≤ 0.10 
Alternate Hypothesis Ha0: At least one predictor has an impact on generator set 
reliability. 
Ha0: At least one β  0, α ≤ 0.10  
The case for rejection of Ho in favor of Ha indicates that survival regression models can 
be applied toward the development of optimal test and maintenance policies for critical 






Research sub-question 1: What is the relationship between emergency diesel-electric 
generator set maintenance periodicity and reliability? 
Null Hypothesis Ho1: Maintenance periodicity has no impact on emergency diesel-electric 
generator set reliability.  
Ho1: β1=β2=β3=…= β18=0, α ≤ 0.10 
Hypothesis Ha1: Maintenance periodicity has a significant impact on emergency diesel-
electric generator set reliability. 
Ha1:  βi ≠ 0, α ≤ 0.10, for any value, i = 1 to 18 
 
Research sub-question 2: What is the relationship between emergency diesel-electric 
generator set test periodicity and reliability? 
Null Hypothesis Ho2: Test periodicity has no impact on generator set reliability. 
Ho2: β18=β19=β20=β21=0, α ≤ 0.10 
Hypothesis Ha2: Test periodicity has a significant impact on emergency diesel-electric 
generator set reliability. 
Ha2: βi ≠ 0, α ≤ 0.10, for any value, i = 19 to 22 
 
Research sub-question 3: What is the relationship between emergency diesel-electric 
generator set size and reliability?  
Null Hypothesis Ho3: Size has no impact on emergency diesel-electric generator set 
reliability. 





Hypothesis H a3: Size has a significant impact on emergency diesel-electric generator set 
reliability. 
Ha3:  βkW ≠ 0, α ≤ 0.10 
 
Research sub-question 4: What is the relationship between emergency diesel-electric 
generator set age and reliability? 
Null Hypothesis Ho4: Age has no impact on emergency diesel-electric generator set 
reliability. 
Ho4: βage = 0, α ≤ 0.10 
Hypothesis H a5: Age has a significant impact on emergency diesel-electric generator set 
reliability. 
Ha4:  βage ≠ 0, α ≤ 0.10 
 
Research sub-question 5: What is the relationship between emergency diesel-electric 
generator set cumulative chronometer run-time and reliability? 
Null Hypothesis Ho5: Cumulative chronometer run-time has no impact on emergency 
diesel-electric generator set reliability. 
Ho5: βrtfv = 0, α ≤ 0.10 
Hypothesis Ha5: Cumulative chronometer run-time has a significant impact on emergency 
diesel-electric generator set reliability. 






Research sub-question 6: What is the relationship between emergency diesel-electric 
generator set load and reliability? 
Null Hypothesis Ho6: Load has no impact on emergency diesel-electric generator set 
reliability. 
Ho6: βL = 0, α ≤ 0.10 
Hypothesis Ha6: Load has a significant impact on emergency diesel-electric generator set 
reliability. 
Ha6:  βL ≠ 0, α ≤ 0.10 
 
Research sub-question 7: What is the relationship between the training of service 
personnel and emergency diesel-electric generator set reliability? 
Null Hypothesis Ho7: Training of servicing personnel has no impact on emergency diesel-
electric generator set reliability. 
Ho7: βb1=βb2=…=βb22=0, α ≤ 0.10 
Hypothesis Ha7: Training of service personnel has a significant impact on emergency 
diesel-electric generator set reliability. 
Ha7:  βbi ≠ 0, α ≤ 0.10, for any value, i = 1 to 22 
 
Research sub-question 8: What is the relationship between the make and model of 
emergency diesel-electric generator set and emergency diesel-electric generator set 
reliability? 
Null Hypothesis Ho8: Make and model have no impact on emergency diesel-electric 





Ho8: βmake=βmodel=0, α ≤ 0.10 
Hypothesis Ha8: Make and/or model have a significant impact on emergency diesel-
electric generator set reliability. 





Table 1. Table of Predictor, Data and Variable Descriptions 
Symbol Description 
ID Unique record identification number for each generator set rational subgroup 
FID Failure ID, unique within each generator set rational subgroup (ID.FID) 
Date Date the record was recorded in the survey format 
Name The assigned name or designation of a particular generator set 
Make Generator set manufacturer 
Model Generator set model 
kW Generator full load rating, in electrical kilowatts (ekW) 
kVA Generator full load rating, in kilovolt-amps 
ns Number of generator starts in the reporting period 
Install_Date Installation date (calendar), the date the generator set was installed 
Ts Start date (calendar), date of the start of the reporting period 
Te End date (calendar) 
Trts Run-time start (hours), generator set chronometer (run-hours) at the start of the 
reporting period 
Trte Run-time end (hours), generator set chronometer (run-hours) at the end of the 
reporting period 
Trt Total run-time (hours), total run-hours in the reporting period 
Fs Total failures to start in the reporting period 
Fr Total failures while running in the reporting period 
Fst Number of failures to start during testing 
Frt Number of failures while running during testing 
Fso Number of operational failures to start 
Fro Number of operational failures while running 
Tfv Failure date (calendar), the date the failure event was observed  
Tage Age (yrs), the generator set age at the failure event 
Trtfv Run hours at failure (hrs), the chronometer (run-hours) at the failure event 
Tttrv Time to repair (hrs) for this failure event 
Fsv Failure to start (Boolean), for this failure event 
Frv Failure while running (Boolean), for this failure event 
Ftv Failure during testing (Boolean), for this failure event 
Fov Failure during operation (Boolean), for this failure event 





Table 1. Continued 
Symbol Description 
xL Typical load, as percent of generator full load kW rating 
x1 Maintenance periodicity (hrs.), contractor service visit; details not known 
x2 Maintenance periodicity (yrs.), check alarms 
x3 Maintenance periodicity (yrs.), check switch & breaker positions 
x4 Maintenance periodicity (yrs.), visual inspection for leaking fluids 
x5 Maintenance periodicity (yrs.), visual inspection of hoses, cables, etc. 
x6 Maintenance periodicity (yrs.), check fuel level 
x7 Maintenance periodicity (yrs.), check oil level 
x8 Maintenance periodicity (yrs.), check coolant level 
x9 Maintenance periodicity (yrs.), check air filter 
x10 Maintenance periodicity (yrs.), battery voltage & physical condition 
x11 Maintenance periodicity (yrs.), check fan belt(s) 
x12 Maintenance periodicity (yrs.), battery resistance or impedance test 
x13 Maintenance periodicity (yrs.), clean unit exterior (including radiator & louvers) 
x14 Maintenance periodicity (yrs.), fuel cleaning (or fluid analysis) 
x15 Maintenance periodicity (yrs.), oil change (or fluid analysis) 
x16 Maintenance periodicity (yrs.), check electrical tightness 
x17 Maintenance periodicity (yrs.), engine intensive maintenance 
x18 Maintenance periodicity (yrs.), generator (electrical) intensive maintenance 
x19 Test periodicity (yrs.), generator set no-load test 
x20 Test periodicity (yrs.), generator set load test on load bank 
x21 Test periodicity (yrs.), generator set load test on operational load 
x22 Test periodicity (yrs.), generator set dead-bus test on operational load 
xb1 Servicing personnel training (factor), contractor service visit; details not known 
xb2 Check alarms 
xb3 Servicing personnel training (factor), check switch & breaker positions 
xb4 Servicing personnel training (factor), visual inspection for leaking fluids 
xb5 Servicing personnel training (factor), visual inspection of hoses, cables, etc. 
xb6 Servicing personnel training (factor), check fuel level 
xb7 Servicing personnel training (factor), check oil level 
xb8 Servicing personnel training (factor), check coolant level 
xb9 Servicing personnel training (factor), check air filter 
xb10 Servicing personnel training (factor), battery voltage & physical condition 
xb11 Servicing personnel training (factor), check fan belt(s) 
xb12 Servicing personnel training (factor), battery resistance or impedance test 
xb13 Servicing personnel training (factor), clean unit exterior (including radiator & 
louvers) 
xb14 Servicing personnel training (factor), fuel cleaning (or fluid analysis) 
xb15 Servicing personnel training (factor), oil change (or fluid analysis) 
xb16 Servicing personnel training (factor), check electrical tightness 
xb17 Servicing personnel training (factor), engine intensive maintenance 
xb18 Servicing personnel training (factor), generator (electrical) intensive maintenance 
xb19 Servicing personnel training (factor), generator set no-load test 





Table 1. Continued 
Symbol Description 
xb21 Servicing personnel training (factor), generator set load test on operational load 






The types of emergency diesel-electric generator sets investigated in this research were 
packaged diesel-electric generator sets with the following characteristics: 
• turbocharged fuel-injected diesel piston engine prime-mover; 
• operating speed of 1500 or 1800 revolutions per minute; 
• direct coupled to an alternating current brushless three-phase electrical generator 
with 120Y/208, 230Y/400 or 277Y/480 volt output at 50 or 60 Hertz; 
• a low-voltage electric starting system with lead-acid batteries operating at 
between 12V-48V; 
• an air-to-water/glycol radiator-based cooling system; and 
• a diesel fuel oil system. 
The focus of this research was on high-efficiency low-emission units of these 
characteristics between 60kW and 2.5MW electrical capacity that have been installed in the past 
twenty years at critical operations power facilities and that run fewer than two hundred hours per 
year. These generator sets generally include optional components to increase reliability such as 
jacket water heaters, strip heaters and dual electric starters. A photograph of a pair of typical 
generator sets included in this research is shown in Figure 1. The process flow for emergency 





were still appropriate to include, such as diesel engines featuring pneumatic start, or engines with 









Although electronic control systems and automatic transfer switches play an important 
role in overall emergency power system performance, NFPA 70B (2016) maintenance 
periodicity recommendations exceed one year for most preventative maintenance actions, and 
detailed maintenance records are rarely kept for this equipment. The combination of long-
interval maintenance and lack of records would make application of the Fehr (2014) framework 
difficult for this equipment. However, the primary serviceable components comprising these 
systems, batteries and breakers, are used in other applications for which reliability-centered 





components have no applicable preventative maintenance beyond cleaning. The characteristics 
of preventative maintenance and primary failure modes of controls and automatic transfer 










Maintenance represents a combination of preventative maintenance and corrective 
maintenance. Preventative maintenance is performed at regular intervals and is intended to 
reduce the failure rate. Corrective maintenance is not performed at regular intervals and involves 
repairs that are discovered and corrected before resulting in an operational failure. A typical 
preventative maintenance plan includes very simple items at frequent intervals, such as visual 
inspections to ensure vents and louvers are not blocked, with more intensive items at longer 




















maintenance includes routine testing as well. This study focuses on routine preventative 
maintenance actions recommended by NFPA 110 (2016) with intervals of a year or less, as 
shown in Appendix D. 
 
TESTS 
Routine tests of emergency diesel-electric generator sets are categorized in this research 
as one of four general tests, which will be referred to as no-load tests, load bank tests, operational 
load tests, and dead-bus tests (Fehr, 2014). 
 
NO-LOAD TESTS 
No-load tests of emergency diesel-electric generator sets involve starting the generator 
set, allowing it to run at idle for a short period, typically between 15 and 60 minutes, and then 
turning it off. This tests the starting system, engine, and some aspects of the control system, but 
this does not place the engine under load and does not test the transfer switch. No-load tests 
represents low-risk to the operator because a test failure has little direct impact on ongoing 
operations of the facility. This test is often run at weekly or biweekly intervals, but running a 
diesel engine at low loads and low operational temperatures can cause unburned diesel fuel to 
build up in the exhaust stack, high moisture content in the lubricating oil, and other unwanted 
conditions (Loehlein, 2007; Tufte, 2014). While some maintenance manuals recommend no-load 
tests as part of routine maintenance (Caterpillar, 1997; Caterpillar, 2010a; Caterpillar, 2010b; 
Caterpillar, 2010c; Caterpillar, 2010d), and use of weekly exercisers is commonly used to 
automatically run no-load tests at many facilities, other maintenance manuals and many 







Load-bank tests of emergency diesel-electric generator sets involve starting the generator 
set and using a load bank to simulate station loads.  This provides a more thorough operational 
test than a no-load test with a similarly low level of risk but does not exercise or test the transfer 
switch. Use of a load bank is often the most practical way to test a generator set to full rated 
operational load. While most load banks are purely resistive, reactive load banks can simulate the 
power factor of many inductive or capacitive loads. NFPA 110 (2016) recommends performing a 
stepped load-bank test to 100% of rated capacity at system commissioning and following 
intensive maintenance, but NFPA 110 only recommends routine load-bank testing if site 
operational loads are low. For sites with low operational loads, a load bank permits testing of the 
site power equipment at higher loads than would normally be possible.   
 
OPERATIONAL LOAD TESTS 
Operational load tests of emergency diesel-electric generator sets involve starting the 
generator set and transferring the facility load to the generator system. This test is frequently 
accomplished by momentarily paralleling the generator sets with utility power to avoid a break in 
facility power or by synchronizing the generator phase angle to match utility power and then 
performing an open-transition transfer with an interruption of power lasting no more than 100 
milliseconds. A monthly load test including the exercising of automatic transfer switchgear is 
legally required by NFPA 110 (2016) for generator sets in some applications including life-
safety and for Department of Defense generator sets by Joint Departments of the Army, the 







A dead-bus test involves simulating a utility failure and is the most comprehensive and 
operationally realistic generator test. This test, by its nature, requires a momentary break in 
facility power and increases the risk of an uninterruptible power supply (UPS) failure causing an 
uninterruptible critical power outage. It also results in nuisance outages to equipment not 
supplied with uninterruptible critical power. The generator system experiences the full in-rush 
and magnetization currents of station loads during a dead bus test, so this test can reveal 
problems not apparent during paralleled transfer or open-transition synchronized operational load 
tests.  
 
GENERATOR SET RATINGS 
ISO 8528-1 (2005) defines generator set duty ratings by four categories.  Emergency 
standby rated generator sets are capable of delivering up to 200 hours of operation per year at an 
average of up to 70% of the generator set rating over any 24 hour period.  Limited-time running 
rated generator sets are capable of delivering up to 500 hours of operation per year at 100% of 
the generator set rating.  Prime rated generator sets are capable of unlimited annual running time 
at an average of up to 70% of the generator set rating over any 24 hour period. Continuous rated 
generator sets are capable of unlimited annual running time at 100% of the generator set rating.  
Although prime and continuous rated generators are not restricted in annual run time by the 
manufacturers, they cannot be run continuously in practice due to maintenance requirements that 
require shut-down to perform. The type of generator sets included in this research are not 
typically used in prime or continuous power applications, as they are not typically economical in 





for emergency standby use if there is risk that extended utility power outages might occur that 
could require generator sets to operate for more than 200 hours in one year. 
It is common practice for manufacturers to dual-rate a diesel-electric generator set model 
at one capacity rating for standby duty and at a 10% lower kW rating for prime duty.  For 
example, a generator set might be rated 1.2MW for prime duty and 1.32MW for standby duty 
and may even have both ratings listed on the nameplate. Generator sets are sized at some sites by 
their prime rating to allow an emergency plant to operate for extended periods of utility outage 
without violating manufacturer ratings but, in all other respects, perform as an emergency 
standby generator set. The Fehr (2014) framework considered prime rated generators running in 
emergency standby duty as if they were emergency standby generators and does not differentiate 
between these two ratings. This research included standby, prime and continuous rated generator 
sets but was delimited exclusive to those generator sets that operate normally in emergency 
standby duty and have not exceeded 200 hours of operation in any one year since installation. 
Another common practice among generator manufacturers is to de-rate one model and 
sell it as a lower-rated model. For example, an 800kW generator set may also be sold as a 
650kW generator set for marketing and price stratification purposes with only minor differences 
in programming and construction between the 650kW and 800kW models. The Fehr (2014) 
framework did not differentiate based on the potential capacity of various frame sizes and treated 
each generator set by its reported nameplate rating. The Fehr (2014) framework was structured to 
detect statistically significant differences in performance between different generator makes and 
models, although it cannot discern between manufacturing tolerances and design or material 






II.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Despite the ubiquity of emergency diesel-electric generator sets in commercial and 
industrial facilities, there has been very little published research on the impact of maintenance 
and tests on the reliability of diesel-electric generator sets manufactured in the last twenty years. 
Hale and Arno (2009) indicated maintenance quality level was influenced equipment availability 
in previous studies, but viewed it as a source of potential bias and but those studies did not 
attempt to quantify equipment reliability or availability as a function of maintenance quality. In 
the generator reliability studies Hale and Arno (2009) performed in the 1990s, they carefully 
chose diversified data sets to reduce the potential of bias from maintenance quality.  
Although there is some published research on older diesel-electric generator sets in 
service during the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, stringent emissions and environmental restrictions in 
the United States and Europe have driven design changes in the diesel engines powering 
emergency diesel-electric generator sets produced since the early 1990s when the Euro and Tier 
emissions standards came into effect in Europe and the United States. Design changes in these 
modern diesel engines include increased fuel injection pressures, retarded injection timing, 
exhaust gas recirculation, higher peak combustion pressures, and articulated pistons with steel 
crowns and high top rings (Margaroni, 1999; Walbolt, 2010), as well as sophisticated emissions 
monitoring systems and digital controls. Advances in metallurgical techniques, emissions 
reduction techniques, and component designs continue to improve performance (Walbolt, 2010). 
Changes since the 1990s are known to impact the life of lubrication oils (Margaroni, 1999), but 
impact of this and other changes with respect to reliability as a function of maintenance and 





NFPA 70B (2016) and NFPA 110 (2016) recommendations represent the standard for 
power component and emergency diesel-electric generator set maintenance and are referenced by 
Department of Defense guidance (TM 5-683, 1995) and IEEE publications (IEEE 3007.2-2010), 
along with recommendations to follow manufacturer recommendations. The commercial 
standards for recommended preventative maintenance have changed little in past revisions of 
NFPA 70B and NFPA 110 and are largely based on studies conducted on diesel-electric 
generator sets in use between 1971 and 1998 (Hale & Arno, 2009; IEEE 493-2007). 
Manufacturers of large emergency diesel-electric generator sets include Caterpillar, 
Cummins Power Generation, Generac Power Systems, Detroit Diesel/MTU Friedrichshafen, 
Volvo-Penta, SDMO, and Kohler. Some of these manufacturers directly reference NFPA 110 for 
recommended maintenance and tests, but others have model-specific maintenance and test 
recommendations. These engines have a lot of similarity of design and often include components 
manufactured by the same suppliers as their competitors (Walbolt, 2010), and it’s possible to 
find major components such as entire engines in generator sets of different manufacturers. 
General recommendations published by Caterpillar (SEBU6042-04, 1997) closely match 
most of the maintenance recommendations of NFPA 110 (2016) including weekly inspection, 
weekly fluid checks, and additional maintenance at one-year and three-year intervals. While 
NFPA 110 (2016) requires monthly generator load tests, Caterpillar only recommends weekly 
no-load tests, with no mention of monthly tests that are legally required on units supporting life-
safety equipment. Other specific maintenance recommendations differ between similar models of 
the same family of generator sets (Caterpillar, 1997; Caterpillar, 2010a; Caterpillar, 2010b; 
Caterpillar, 2010c; Caterpillar, 2010d). Manufacturer-certified technicians often contradict 





load tests damage the engine and should be avoided, while others strongly advocate weekly no-
load tests, and still others recommend only quarterly maintenance. While Caterpillar publications 
recommend weekly and monthly maintenance and tests on all emergency diesel-electric 
generator sets, Caterpillar honors the manufacturer’s warranty on generators that receive only 












The published recommendations of Cummins Power Generation (Loehlein, 2007), shown 
in Table 2, are more stringent than NFPA 110 (2016). Cummins Power Generation recommends 
performing daily checks for a number of items that Caterpillar and NFPA 110 (2016) 
recommend performing weekly. Cummins Power Generation explicitly recommends holding 
periods of no-load operation to a minimum and recommends a 30-minute generator load test 
once a month, similar to the monthly load test required by NFPA 110 (2016) and Joint 
Departments of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force Technical Manual TM 5-683 (1995). 
 
HISTORICAL EMERGENCY DIESEL-ELECTRIC GENERATOR RESEARCH 
Fehr and Cotter (2014) proposed the methodology used herein to determine the 
relationship between generator set maintenance and testing and reliability. Fehr (2014) expanded 
and tested this methodology, but data acquisition was limited only to a small number of well-
maintained generator sets to test Fehr’s methods, and did not include enough operational failure 
data to achieve statistically significant results. Nevertheless, Fehr’s initial small-scale data 
analysis validated the methodology and the data provided important information on the mean 
reliability of well-maintained generator sets, even if the 2014 study was insufficient to determine 
relationships between maintenance and test predictors and reliability. 
The United States Army Corp of Engineers’ Power Reliability Enhancement Program 
(PREP) investigated the reliability and availability of emergency generators from studies 
compiled from multiple sources in the early 1970s. PREP discovered these earlier studies 
contained confusing information, and the database often contradicted itself (Hale & Arno, 2009). 
Those studies are obsolete now, but they were the foundation that commercial and governmental 





The most recent large-scale study on generator set reliability was conducted on behalf of 
PREP in the mid-1990s, and the results were compiled in TM 5-698-5 (2006). This was a broad 
study looking to update previous records by looking at the contemporary technology equipment 
installed since 1971. The PREP study forming the basis for TM 5-698-5 (2006) recognized that 
there are differing levels of maintenance for different generators but did not differentiate 
between the reliability of each maintenance plan. Instead, the authors chose a cross-section of 
generators of differing maintenance to reduce bias so that they could present a single set of 
reliability and availability numbers for each category of equipment for the purpose of system 
reliability and availability calculations. This PREP study assumed exponential failure 
distributions and calculated an annual reliability factor of 0.8838 for packaged diesel engine 
generators of 250kW-1.5MW rated capacity in standby duty, based on 672.1 unit-years of 
operation with 83 failures. This PREP study calculated an annual reliability factor of 0.5310 for 
unpackaged diesel engine generators of 750kW-7MW rated capacity in standby duty, based on 
235.4 unit-years and 149 failures. 
IEEE 493-2007, often referred to as the IEEE Gold Book, is the commercial standard for 
design of emergency and critical power plants. It contains methods for calculating overall power 
system reliability and contains reliability and availability values for making those calculations. 
IEEE 493-2007 references a 1980 generator survey that states the failure rate of emergency and 
standby generators is 0.00536 failures per run-hour and 0.0135 failures per start attempt, with an 
aggregated failure rate of 0.1691 failures per year and an average downtime of 478.0 hours per 
failure. This differs from the results of a later study presented in the same IEEE document and 
TM 5-698-5 (2006), which found 0.1235 failures per year and a mean time to repair of 18.28 





explained as increased reliability from technological advances, the order of magnitude disparity 
in downtime and mean time to repair is difficult to ignore and could be a result of using small 
pools of data or including out-of-control data in the average. The disparity and scarcity of data 
from the two primary studies puts the reliability of this data in question. If the reliability of data 
for such high profile equipment as generators is in question, the reliability of data for other 
equipment with lower incidence of record keeping is also in question.  
Fehr (2014) used TM 5-698-5 (2006) methods to calculate an annual reliability factor of 
0.921 and 0.074 failures per year based on 126.71 unit-years of well-maintained generator sets in 
standby service operation and 9 test and operational failures. This is a much lower failure rate 
than 0.1235 (TM 5-698-5, 2006) or 0.1691 (IEEE, 2007) recorded by previous studies. Fehr 
(2014) estimated the inherent availability Ai = 0.999712 for the well-maintained generator sets in 
that data set, which is an order of magnitude lower unavailability than the Ai = 0.9974 listed in 
the PREP database (TM 5-698-5, 2006). It is not clear from prior research whether the 
discrepancies between these results is due to higher reliability of the latest models of generators, 
due to different maintenance practices, or due to some combination of these or other conditions. 
 
DIESEL ENGINE MAINTENANCE RESEARCH IN OTHER APPLICATIONS 
There have been several studies researching preventative maintenance and replacement 
cycles for diesel engines in transportation and construction fleets, but emergency generator sets 
run at a much different duty cycle with fewer run hours than most other diesel engines and 
exhibit different wear profiles. Though the findings of these studies are not directly applicable to 
emergency diesel-electric generator sets, the structure of the studies, models used, and other 





Márquez and Herguedas (2004) investigated the failure rate of diesel engines powering 
earthmoving equipment in mining operations in Spain, concentrating on cylinder liner failures in 
1.8MW, 16-cylinder diesel 1900 rpm engines similar to those used for emergency generators. 
Through their research, they discovered 50% of the failures were occurring in 24% of the 
cylinders and worked with the manufacturer to determine the assignable cause was excessive 
vibrations in the crankshaft at high engine inclinations. This allowed the manufacturer to address 
the problem in future designs and for the mine maintenance departments to increase preventative 
maintenance on the problem cylinders.  Márquez and Herguedas (2004) used maintenance 
records to conduct this analysis. The records included fifteen trucks with twenty-three failures. 
They recognized data censoring and devised a model that was insensitive to the data censoring. 
For the analysis, they simplified the data results and performed a bi-parameter Weibull plot of 
engine run-hours with linear and quadratic trend regression. They were then able to select a tri-
parameter Weibull to analyze the failure of specific cylinders. 
Leung and Lai (2003) investigated the preventative maintenance and replacement of 
diesel engines powering city buses in Hong Kong. They reviewed a subset of 2,282 repair 
records from buses powered by 171.5kW 1900 rpm turbocharged diesel engines and 134.2kW 
1850 rpm naturally aspirated diesel engines. They used the maximum-likelihood density 
estimation (MLDE) and nearest-neighbor density estimation (NNDE) procedures with the 
sequential method to determine optimal preventative maintenance and replacement intervals. By 
these means, they calculated the lowest combined total cost of preventative maintenance, 
corrective maintenance, and opportunity costs lost during maintenance and repair. Leung and Lai 
determined that the sequential method was better than the non-homogeneous Poisson process 





system to original condition while the sequential model accounted for slow degradation of 
engine components due to use.   
The duty cycle of city busses and emergency diesel-electric generator sets differ 
considerably. The city buses in Leung and Lai’s (2003) study experience more run-hours in one 
or two days than a typical emergency diesel-electric generator experiences in a year, so the 
assumptions made by Leung and Lai regarding slow degradation may not entirely apply to 
emergency diesel-electric generator sets. The sequential method may not provide any advantages 




Table 3.  Equipment Failure Rate Multipliers vs. Maintenance Quality (IEEE 493-2007) 
Maintenance 
Quality 
Transformers Circuit Breakers Motors 
Excellent 0.95 0.91 0.89 
Fair 1.05 1.06 1.07 
Poor 1.51 1.28 1.97 
All 1.00 1.00 1.00 





A study published in 1974 regarding the impact of maintenance on the reliability of 
electrical equipment in industrial plants found that maintenance quality and periodicity had a 
significant impact on failure reduction. Failure rate multipliers were calculated from this data 
showing that excellent maintenance could increase reliability of those power system components 
40-120% more than similar components receiving poor maintenance (IEEE, 1974). These values 
are shown in Table 3. 
The airline industry and FAA found that preventative maintenance was only effective for 





reliability-centered maintenance and failure modes and effects analysis (Moubray, 1997; IEEE 
493-2007). 
 
RARE EVENTS SURVIVAL ANALYSIS 
While the field of risk analysis includes a great deal of research on rare events, rare 
events are considered differently in statistical analysis and risk analysis, as risk analysis 
considers events as a combination of occurrence rate and consequence (Osterloh & Jaenish, 
2016) while statistical analysis only considers occurrence rate. Another difficulty in researching 
statistical techniques for rare events is that there is no single universal definition. Some risk 
analysis researchers calculate numerical probabilities while others use subjective definitions and 
rely on polls of experts to develop quantitative results. While subjective polling techniques may 
be applicable to extremely complex systems that are difficult to mathematically model, or events 
so rare there is little hard quantitative data available, they’re less precise in areas where 
numerical studies are possible, and can be off by many orders of magnitude (Osterloh & Jaenish, 
2016).  
 Rowe (2006) defines a rare event as one that has np < 0.01 chance of occurring per year, 
and defines all others as ordinary events. While total power system failures may be considered 
rare events in facilities with power systems designed with redundancy and high availability, the 
failure rate of an individual generator set is reported by previous studies as and λ = 0.074 (Fehr, 
2014) and λ = .1235 (TM 5-695-5, 2006), neither of which are considered rare events per Rowe. 
However, statistical techniques describing ordinary events create difficulties for events that while 





analysis are present in the field of generator set maintenance, such as belief overcoming hard 
data.   
 Xiao and Xie (2016) found maximum likelihood estimator techniques resulted in ill-
posed estimates when no failures were observed and resulted in very high variances when the 
time, t, is small. However, Xiao and Xie also found that given enough time, the maximum 
likelihood estimate can provide good results. While generator set failures may be observed as 
rare by maintainers whose experience is limited to a small set of units, generator set failures are 
considered ordinary rate events in statistics. Therefore, increasing the amount of data in the study 
may be a reasonable means to achieve high quality results. This finding may help address the 
concern raised by Fehr (2014) that poorly-maintained generator sets often have poor quality logs 
and are more difficult to acquire data for than well-maintained generator sets. Even if data is 
harder to acquire for poorly-maintained generator sets, less data is needed due to the higher 
failure rates of those units as compared to well-maintained generator sets for which data is more 
readily available, but failure rates are lower. 
 
ANALYSIS METHODS IN RELATED FIELDS 
To determine the optimum maintenance cycle of diesel bus engines, Leung and Kai 
(2003) used a maximum-likelihood density estimation (MLDE) procedure, assuming a Weibull 
estimation. They used η as the scale parameter and m as the shape parameter, with a cumulative 


















 Leung and Kai (2003) estimated the value of 𝜃 = (𝜂,𝑚) using the nearest neighbor 
distribution estimation (NNDE). 
 Márquez and Herguedas (2004) also used a Weibull distribution to determine failure rates 
for earthmoving equipment but took a more straightforward approach to calculate Weibull scale 
and shape parameters by using spreadsheet software. They graphed distribution function data as 
an x/y plot of⁡𝑥 = ln(𝑡) and 𝑦 = ln⁡(ln⁡(1 ⁄ (1 − 𝐹(𝑡)⁡))⁡), where 𝐹(𝑡) is the life distribution 
function based on manufacturer laboratory testing, and they used the spreadsheet software’s 
built-in functions to calculate quadratic and linear trend lines. If the two trend lines were similar, 
they estimated the bi-parameter Weibull distribution using the parameters from the linear 
regression. Where the two were not similar, they modified the time origin to reach a better fit and 
chose a tri-parameter Weibull instead.  
 Hale and Arno (2009) used an exponential failure distribution to model emergency 
diesel-electric set reliability as R(t)=e-λt, with the failure rate per year (λ) calculated as the total 
number of failures divided by the calendar time the records were collected. They calculated 
availability as a function of mean time between failures (MTBF), mean down-time (MDT), and 
mean time to repair (MTTF), where operational availability (Ao) is Ao = MTBM/(MTBM+MDT) 
and inherent availability (Ai) is Ai = MTBF/(MTBF+MTTR).  TM 5-698-5 (2006) and IEEE 493-
2007 use the same methods and nomenclature. For time-truncated data sets where no failures 
were recorded, TM 5-698-5 (2006) utilized a χ2 60% single side confidence interval to calculate 
λ and MTBF. 
 Zhou et al. (2014) attempted to develop a survival model for a highly censored sample of 





failures, only one of which was determined to be age related. With a failure rate of 
approximately 0.2% per year, transformer failures in this study were rare events, and Zhou et al. 
required special techniques to overcome censoring. Zhou et al. attempted to analyze this sample 
using a Weibull distribution, but met with considerable challenge due to the high level of 
censoring and dominance of random failures over age related failures. The failure distribution for 
this sample more closely resembles an exponential distribution than a Weibull distribution, as is 
common in the mid-life cycle of a Weibull distributed group, and Zhou et al. concluded the 
sample size was too heavily censored and did not include enough units reaching the end of the 
Weibull wear-out cycle. 
 Relevance vector machine (RVM) (Tipping, 2001) and support vector machine (SVM) 
machine learning techniques have been used in several studies related to engine maintenance (Jia 
& Zhao, 2006; Wang et al, 2013). RVM and SVM utilize a combination of mathematical 
regression and Bayesian statistics to map data points into two different categories. While these 
techniques have applications in condition-based maintenance and predictive maintenance, they 
are difficult to apply to survival data with high degrees of left truncation and right censorship and 
do not appear to have advantages over Cox (1972) regression for this type of survival analysis. 
Many research teams including Amorim and Cai (2015); Hosmer, Lemeshow, and May 
(2008); Kalbfleisch and Prentice (2002); and Kelly and Lim (2000) have discussed methods 
developed for recurring events in the medical field. The Andersen and Gill (1982) method is a 
counting method formulated in terms of increments in the number of events along the timeline, 
but it is restrictive for application to emergency generator set reliability as it requires a right-
continuous process without left truncation and is intolerant to treatment changes over the life of 





that share many of the same application restrictions (Amorim & Cai, 2015; Kelly & Lim, 2000). 
The only emergency generator sets that could be analyzed by these methods would need to have 
complete records available back to installation and no changes in maintenance or test periodicity 
over potentially decades of operation. However, placing such a restriction on data acquisition to 
only generator sets with such records and history could introduce bias. The most appropriate 
methods for analyzing generator set records must be insensitive to left truncation and right 
censorship. Other models discussed by research teams extend from Andersen and Gill (1982)and 
share the same limitations or require special cases not applicable to emergency generator set 
reliability. Hosmer, Lemeshow, and May (2008) criticize the Andersen and Gill (1982) method 
for assuming complete independence between events to be unrealistically simple for events such 
as cancer reoccurrence, but this is not necessarily the case for a repairable machine, and models 
dependent on stratification of recurrent failure data are difficult to apply to generator sets which 
fail in a multitude of ways.    
Kelly and Lim (2002) discuss conditional approaches to analyzing recurrent event data 
and observed that while conditional approaches assume the current event is unaffected by earlier 
events, that assumption can in some cases be relaxed by means of additional covariates to 
represent prior events or other dependencies. This approach appears similar in concept to the 
introduction of generator set age and run hour covariates independently proposed by Fehr (2014) 
to analyze time dependent covariates for generator set age and cumulative run hours within a 
Cox linear regression of arbitrary start time. One conditional approach is the Prentice, Williams, 
and Peterson (1981) gap-time method, which is similar to Anderson and Gill (1982) but resets 
the clock after each event. Gap-time includes stratification in the model, with each failure 





requires full knowledge of prior failures to assign strata to each data set, and is thus not suitable 
to apply to emergency generator set reliability modeling.   
 
POST-HOC POWER ANALYSIS AND VALIDITY 
Numerous methods have been developed for pre-hoc power analysis for statistical 
models, but little research has been accomplished regarding post-hoc power analysis of 
parametric survival models based upon unconstrained and heavily censored data sets. Existing 
literature was reviewed for methods of calculating post-hoc Type II error and realized power.  
Schoenfeld (1983), Hsieh and Lavori (2007), Cohen and Cohen (1983), Cohen (1987), Lachin 
(1984), and Liu (2014) provided relevant methods for pre-hoc regression power analysis, but not 
post-hoc, and not specific to survival analysis.  Lachin (1984) spoke directly to survival analysis, 
but Lachin’s methods are only applicable to groups with a single binary independent variable and 
an exponential failure distribution. Of these methods, Hsieh and Lavori (2007) were the most 
relevant to this research and were used herein for pre-hoc power analysis and the estimation of 
data required.  Although none of the power analysis methods reviewed herein were discussed by 
their authors for post-hoc analysis, methods for potential applicability were reviewed.  
Lachin (1984) discussed different methods for F-test based calculations of power for 
uncensored and censored survival data, but both methods require the calculation of exponential 
failure rates λc and λt for the control and treatment groups. While Lachin’s discussed methods are 
applicable to designed experiments or data sets where subjects are randomly assigned to either 
subpopulation, the Fehr (2014) model includes 26 predictors which are unlikely to all be fully 
independent. Without independence of those predictors, single values of λ cannot be accurately 





the subpopulation for a low-cost generator set model may include a disproportionate sample of 
low-cost maintenance, and attempts to calculate a subpopulation λmodel would be biased by the 
difference in maintenance. As Lachin’s method is highly sensitive to such sampling bias but does 
not provide a means of accounting for it, it cannot be used to calculate power for emergency 
diesel-electric generator set research.   
Cohen and Cohen (1983) provided a method to calculate n* for multiple regression 
correlation based upon the regression variance R2 and tables of values for different degrees of 
freedom and several Type I and Type II error levels. Cohen and Cohen (1983) provided 
equations both for population R2 and for sample R2 and an equation that, given known n* and R2, 
can be solved for power.  Cohens’ method, in Cohens’ Equation 3.7.2, was designed for pre-hoc 
determination of the quantity of data required and uses the population effects size f2 (Cohens’ 
Equation 3.7.1), although Cohen and Cohen cautioned against using this for a sample and stated 
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Post-hoc, n* = n, and are R2 and k are known.  Substituting these known values into 





Cohen (1987), this permits use of Cohen’s L tables in reverse to look up the observed power β 
associated with the experimental results.  A direct calculation of this is also supported by the 















Cohen and Cohen (1983) provided a similar method to calculate the n* required for each 
independent regression coefficient for desired power prior to the experiment, but not a means to 
calculate the observed power after data is acquired. Hoenig and Heisey (2001) provided a 
method to estimate observed power for regression coefficients directly from the p-values 
automatically calculated and provided in many software packages. This method is only 
applicable to significant predictors and cannot be used to estimate the observed power for 
predictors found not significant in the regression results; attempts to use the p-value to calculate 
β from post-hoc predictors excluded from the final regression model do not give valid results. 
None of the literature reviewed provided a method for determining the post-hoc observed power 
for these excluded predictors and the failure to reject the null hypothesis, only pre-hoc 
estimations of power as a function of anticipated R2; Steidl, Hayes, and Schauber (1987) 
contends such a measurement is meaningless. Murphy, Myors, and Wolach (2014) discussed use 
of post-hoc findings to create an estimate of the potential power of prior research, but did not 





using experimental data to increase the accuracy of pre-hoc estimates, but offer little benefit for 
model validation. 
Hoenig and Heisey (2001) argue that observed power is not useful in post-hoc analysis 
due to what they call the power approach paradox, that higher observed power does not imply 
stronger evidence for a null hypothesis that is not rejected. In support of this assertion, they 
provide several examples where post-hoc observed power analysis presents logical flaws and 
often nonsensical results. They further contend that once the confidence interval is calculated, 
power analysis provides no further useful information, and recommend post-hoc power analysis 
should not be done. Steidl, Hayes, and Schauber (1987) states this similarly, contending that 
retrospective power analysis provides results with no relation to true power. These arguments are 
themselves not without criticism, but there remains little published literature on the subject.  This 
is unfortunate given the importance of quantifying observed power and Type II error 
probabilities for excluded predictors, but is consistent with the lack of post-hoc power analysis in 
prior multiple regression/correlation analysis research. Liu (2014) discusses the relationship 
between confidence intervals, power, and precision, but does not provide a post-hoc method to 
determine observed β.  Steidl, Hayes, and Schauber (1987) and Hoenig and Heisey (2001) 
recommend the use of confidence intervals as useful for determining what range the effects size 
may be and potentially the low probability than a specified effects size exists. Therefore, while it 
may not be possible to directly calculate the probability of falsely failing to reject the null 
hypothesis, by calculation of the confidence interval it is possible to make a reasonable 
calculation of the probability that the effects size is so small as to not be of practical importance 





Another question raised by this research relates to validation of the model for 
applicability to various subpopulations. Specifically, make, model, and size were included in the 
model as predictors, but were not anticipated to have significant results. Cox (1972) non-
parametric regression methods can calculate α for these predictors but cannot return any direct 
information about β or the risk of falsely failing to reject the null hypothesis that there is no 
relationship between generator set make, model, and size and reliability. Steidl, Hayes, and 
Schauber (1997), Hoenig and Heisey (2001), and Murphy, Myors, and Wolach (2016) advocated 
utilizing the model confidence intervals to qualitatively judge model adequacy, but this does not 
provide much useful information on the validity of smaller subgroups. Cohen (1987) provided a 
method for analyzing data sets that is applicable to Cox regressions; although this method is only 
discussed for pre-hoc power analysis, solving with known values from experimental data can be 
used to estimate experimental power and permits to assessment of model validity with more 
confidence.  
Fehr (2014) made a general a priori assumption that generator set make, model, and size 
within the delimitations of this research represent a common population with a common response 
to maintenance.  Present maintenance guidance (NFPA 70B, 2016) does not make distinctions of 
differing maintenance on make, model, or size and there are reasonable arguments for this 
assumption supported by many technicians (Walbolt, 2010). Despite such industry confidence, 
there is no solid research to support the assertion of common response. Fortunately, this 
assumption can be easily tested within the framework of this research by inclusion of make and 
model factors and a size covariate in the model. If the p-values for these predictors are found to 





to maintenance holds. However, if any of these subpopulation predictors are found to be 
significant, model validity for these subpopulations must be determined. 
If the common population assumption fails, there is little research into subpopulation 
validity in survival distributions with high levels of left truncation and right censorship that can 
be directly applied to address it. Cohen (1983) presents a related method intended to estimate the 
proportion of the variance contribution of the subpopulation Y∙B in equation 4.5.2. B represents 
the subpopulation being analyzed and A represents the population containing all others. Y∙B is the 
experimental sample data set for subpopulation B, Y∙A is the experimental sample set for the 
remaining population, and Y∙AB represents the entirety of the experimental data. Utilizing the F 
equation for samples instead of the population effects size f2, and solving for L results in 
Equation 3 and permits use of Cohen’s L tables in reverse to look up the observed power β 
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 However, Cohen’s (1983) F-test statistic for data sets has a weakness when data sets are 
not similar size. For example, if Y∙AB represented student GRE scores and Y∙A consisted of 





4.4.2 would inaccurately indicate high power that the two subpopulations were the same. As the 
data sets anticipated from this study are likely to include some makes, models, or sizes in much 
larger or smaller numbers than others, use of this equation could be problematic.   
Cohen’s (1983) more general Equation 3.6.1 does not share the same weakness for 
proportionately small sample subpopulations, and Equation 2 derived from this can be directly 
applied to each sample subpopulation. However, as the sample subpopulations may be too small 
or too homogenous in test and maintenance periodicity to independently derive significant 
models, methods comparing Cox (1972) regression models cannot be used with any confidence 
of high quality results. As a model already exists from the general population regression, the 
regression sum of squares for the final model can be calculated for each sample subpopulation, 
and an F test performed to compare each sample subpopulation to the general population. If the 
model is valid for the sample subpopulation and the relationship with the subpopulation can be 
represented as a treatment in the model, the weighted difference between the sum of squares 
response for the subpopulation and general population should be statistically insignificant. If this 
test fails, additional interaction terms can be explored that may better represent the 
subpopulation, or the subpopulation removed from the study if appropriate.  
 
SECONDARY DATA 
Enormous quantities of data exist in the form of historical logs and records from 
operations, maintenance, and repair of emergency diesel-electric generator sets, similar to other 
existing data across a myriad of applications and industries. The primary advantage of such data 
is that it already exists and is therefore often easier to collect than devising and conducting new 





However, those advantages are also disadvantages, as historic logs and records were rarely 
recorded under controlled conditions for the sake of pure research, and this secondary data is 
often of questionable scientific value for positivistic research due to questionable internal 
validity and reliability (Souza-Posa, 2015). Crowder and Lancaster (2008) suggest that such 
secondary data is only useful for exploratory research for collection of primary data, but 
Crowder and Lancaster were focused more on business data and reports and did not consider the 
specific application of secondary data in the form of logs and records. 
Historic logs and records for operations, maintenance, and repair represent a special case 
subset of secondary data and can be a powerful and economical source of data for analysis if 
properly used. Even if they were not originally created for pure scientific research, such logs are 
generally intended as an objective series of measurements for engineering studies, and often have 
significant practical value to aid managers and maintenance personnel in decision-making 
(Márquez & Herguedas, 2004). Equipment logs and records have been used successfully for 
research by several teams (Gat & Eisenbeis, 2000; Mathur, 2002; Márquez & Herguedas, 2004; 
Devaney et al, 2005; Fehr, 2014). Devaney et al. (2005) conclude that “maintenance logs contain 
a potential wealth of information that can be used to improve the maintenance of complicated 
machinery, reduce downtimes, and prevent failures.”  Herein, the use of historic logs and records 
as research data is discussed as well as a review of issues found by researchers and a review of 
techniques used to mitigate those issues. A consolidated methodology is presented to minimize 
the risk inherent in using handling historic logs and records for scientific research, and to 
maximize the research utility from these potentially rich sources of data. 
Márquez and Herguedas (2004) examined maintenance records as a tool for root cause 





lack of computerized records represented common problems. They found that data from 
equipment had to be screened properly to ensure the data represented the same failure modes in 
homogenous equipment under similar conditions. They stressed the importance of computerized 
maintenance management and standardized record keeping as very important to structuring 
records into a manner to aid decision-making for the maintenance personnel involved, and for 
successful exploitation of such data for broader studies. They found the expert judgment of 
maintenance engineers to be a significant benefit.   
Crowder and Lancaster (2008) asked “What do I need to know?” and “How accurate and 
detailed does the data need to be?” and discussed the general use of secondary data in detail. The 
techniques Crowder and Lancaster presented were not specific to historic logs and records, but 
suggested internal secondary data was more reliable than external secondary data due to the 
greater level of access researchers are typically granted for internal data. Crowder and Lancaster 
(2008) further stated that secondary data was rarely useful in answering research questions, but 
this may be because they were primarily considering financial, sales, marketing and personnel 
data and did not list maintenance and operational logs and records or other engineering data 
among examples of secondary data considered in their discussion. Some of the techniques 
presented are nevertheless applicable to engineering research and describe creation of a 
methodology able to take advantage of this secondary data including identifying the problem, 
developing an approach, and formulating a research design. 
Gat and Eisenbeis (2000) found the service life and low failure rate of some samples to 
be a challenge for analysis, and excluded several samples from the data set due to short service 





Fehr (2014) found that even in a homogenous group with similar equipment and common 
guidance and policy mandating specific logs be kept, such records were rarely complete and 
accessible in practice and mostly existed in handwritten form. Fehr (2014) further found that that 
poorly-maintained equipment often also had poor record keeping, potentially introducing 
selection bias and skewing studies towards those of well-maintained equipment by the simple 
fact that those well-maintained units had the most complete records and were more easily 
accessible. Maintenance performed by third parties introduced additional challenges, as each 
organization kept records in a different way, and records on some units were split between the 
operational organization and the maintenance organization. A lot of manual effort was required 
by the researchers to overcome the challenges presented by the inconsistent record keeping, and 
the analysis had to be explicitly designed to minimize bias from the data. 
Devaney et al. (2005) data-mined equipment maintenance logs of complex machinery, 
which largely consisted of terse free-text input. They found that even when such logs are 
recorded for the explicit use of long-term tracking of equipment condition, performance, and 
reliability, such records included large variation in the input and were often difficult to 
consistently interpret via automation. They found that the vocabulary was inconsistent and often 
included jargon, and the terminology used didn’t always correspond to systems of interest. They 
also found logs to be full of spelling errors, grammar errors, typographical errors, and extremely 
terse non-standard abbreviations. They also found that most machines have statistically few 
actions logged per year, making such sets too sparse for data-intensive approaches. Despite the 
challenges, Devaney et al. (2005) developed a software algorithm using text analytics, clustering 
techniques and a case-based reasoning to analyze the maintenance data, demonstrating that 





Souza-Poza (2015) asserts that the reliability and validity of secondary data must be 
verified, and the secondary data must be demonstrable as mind-independent and sufficiently 
positivistic to accomplish the research goals. 
Márquez and Herguedas (2004), Fehr (2014), and Gat and Eisenbeis (2000) found data 
censoring by preventative maintenance to be a significant issue for failure modes and effects 
analysis (Moubray, 1997); few managers permit equipment to proceed to the point of failure, and 
maintenance actions modified the failure rate distribution. All three research teams used 
mathematical techniques tolerant of censoring to analyze the censored data, but such techniques 
often require assumptions be made and may not be applicable in all cases or for all failure 
distributions.  
Márquez and Herguedas (2004), Fehr (2014), and Gat and Eisenbeis (2000) all also 
experienced missing data, and small sample sizes meant that only a portion of possible failure 
combinations were represented in their data sets. Márquez and Herguedas (2004) and Gat and 
Eisenbeis (2000) chose to address this deficiency by only analyzing data for which sufficient 
data was available; Márquez and Herguedas (2004) only analyzed cylinders which exhibited at 
least three failures within the fleet, and Gat and Eisenbeis (2000) excluded data sets for which 
limited data was available. Márquez and Herguedas (2004) developed a data map, but neither 
Márquez and Herguedas nor Gat and Eisenbeis attempted any techniques to reconstruct missing 
data. Fehr (2014) utilized inductive reasoning to reconstruct portions of incomplete data records 
from partial generator data records, such as using knowledge of generator test frequency and 
duration to estimate the cumulative generator run hours at different points in time; such 
techniques may increase the quantity of analyzable data, but introduce error and risk of 





III.  METHODOLOGY 
 
Failure modes and effects analysis is a powerful tool for analyzing equipment failure, but 
this analysis relies upon observing and measuring failure rates of each system component to 
determine failure patterns (Moubray, 1997). This cannot be accurately performed on operational 
equipment receiving high levels of preventative and predictive maintenance, as this maintenance 
introduces bias and censorship into the data. Known high failure rate items such as batteries, 
filters, and lubricating oil are rarely allowed to degrade to the point of system failure in well-
maintained units. Research by Alion Science and Technology (2006) supports this and indicates 
other failure modes may dominate. This right censorship of failure data by preventative 
maintenance limits the effectiveness of reliability-centered maintenance studies proposed by 
Moubray (1997) for this type of application. The effectiveness of the implemented maintenance 
and test plans at each facility can instead be measured by survival analysis of the overall 
emergency diesel-electric generator system.   
Where failure rates exhibit a traditional Weibull wear-out pattern, there is an expected 
optimal maintenance periodicity. For such components, there is a point where longer intervals 
between maintenance would result in a significant increase in failures but where shorter intervals 
show little or no reduction in failures. The point at which longer intervals represent an increase 
in failure rate but shorter intervals do not is the point of optimum maintenance periodicity. For 
failure modes that result in detectable degradation just prior to failure, this optimal predictive 
maintenance periodicity is known as the Nett P-F interval (Moubray, 1997).   
Many failure-finding tasks can reduce the operational failure rate at ever decreasing 





near-instant detection of hidden failures. But for intrusive actions or actions that must remove the 
generator set from operational service to perform, excessive maintenance results in an increase in 
maintenance down time and a decrease in inherent availability. Excessive maintenance can also 
increase the risk from human error, increase component wear, or increase the risk of installation 
of a defective component causing a failure that otherwise would not have occurred. Thus, 
excessive maintenance is not necessarily erring on the side of caution and may result in an 
increase of operational risk. For failure-finding tasks where this is the case, the minima of the 
failure rate is the optimal point.  
The research herein utilizes and refines the methodology developed and tested by Fehr 
(2014) to model emergency diesel-electric generator set reliability as a function of maintenance 
and test periodicity with the intention of determining optimal maintenance and test periodicities 
for maximum operational diesel-electric generator set reliability. This methodology was based 
upon examining existing emergency-diesel electric generator set logs for generator sets 
supporting critical operations power systems, high-reliability applications, and life safety 
applications. These logs were required to be maintained per government regulations (TM 5-683, 
1995; NFPA 110, 2016; EPA, 2016) and include records of generator set maintenance, tests, 
repairs, run-hours, starts and failures. However, the means of maintaining these records varied, 
as no specific formats were mandated. Data gathered from these logs was compiled into the 
standardized form in Appendix A (Fehr, 2014), which allowed this data to be combined into a 
single database for analysis. 
A generalized survival function was created from the generator set history data with 
focus on operational failures as the key survivability event. A distinction was made between 





tests and failures during actual emergency operation. To avoid biasing against sites with high 
levels of testing, corrective maintenance and failures during scheduled routine tests were not 
included as operational failures in the survival analysis. 
Reliability-centered maintenance practices would consider all critical component failures 
to be system failures regardless of whether the failures occurred during tests or operation, but 
such a philosophy is not appropriate for determination of optimal maintenance levels as it can 
introduce bias against sites with more frequent maintenance. In an extreme example, if a 
component in an emergency generator set exhibiting hidden failure characteristics is found to 
have a mean time to failure of 30 days, sites that perform weekly tests are likely to log a higher 
total number of annual failures and annual maintenance downtime than sites performing no 
testing. However, the sites performing weekly testing are much more likely to have units that 
function during actual emergency operation. From a holistic facility perspective, failures of 
emergency diesel-electric generator sets during emergency operation result in facility operational 
downtime, while failures during testing do not. As this study was interested in determining 
optimal practice for operational reliability and availability, it considered failures discovered and 
corrected during testing to be maintenance actions and not failure events. Such a test failure was 
only considered an operational failure if the resultant deficiency could not be corrected in time to 
avert failure during subsequent emergency operation. Occurrences of operational failures 
stemming from test failures were treated as operational failures within this study. 
The ability of existing maintenance practices to address failures of individual subsystem 
components was implicit within the observed survival function of the system. This approach was 





subsystem components, especially where conflation of maintenance or test actions is occurring.  
This approach was designed to err on the side of excessive rather than insufficient maintenance. 
 
RESEARCH SCOPE 
This research was focused on answering the research question and subquestions for the 
subset of emergency generator sets most common at the government and commercial facilities 
participating in this study. These facilities predominantly utilize emergency backup electrical 
power from water-cooled diesel fuel-injected turbocharged piston engines driving permanent-
magnet excited electrical alternators. While such diesel-electric generator sets can be small 
enough to roll around a jobsite or large enough to support entire industrial complexes, this 
research was focused on fixed generator sets of sizes and duty cycles commonly found in small 
and medium data centers, telecommunications sites, hospitals, commercial facilities, and critical 
operations facilities. To avoid introducing variances from unique issues that may occur in very 
large, very small, or uncommon systems, data acquisition for this study was limited to the subset 
of units described in Chapter I, SYSTEM COMPONENTS.  Generator sets with similar 
characteristics were also included when data was readily available but units such as diesel-
turbine generator sets and portable generator sets used in prime duty for temporary power were 
excluded even when data was available.  
Emissions requirements for non-road diesel engines went into effect in 1996 in the 
United States and in 1999 in Europe, with phased implementations of increasingly stringent 
regulations in subsequent years. Compliance prior to these dates was not required by the United 
States’ Clean Air Act of 1990 (Environmental Protection Agency, 2013) or similar European 





often due to commonalities in product lines with road-going diesel engines and other markets 
which faced earlier compliance requirements. While diesel-electric generator sets are complex 
systems-of-systems, the basic diesel engine technology used is similar across all major 
manufacturers and models, as are reliability centered maintenance philosophies. This results in 
many common routine maintenance actions between disparate makes and models, and often 
similar recommendations for periodicity of those maintenance actions.   
The scope of this study was primarily limited to modern, high-efficiency, low emission 
generator sets. Generator sets manufactured since the passage of the 1990 Clean Air Act 
Amendments were the most common subset in use at the facilities participating in this study, but 
little research has been published on the reliability or maintenance of this generation of generator 
sets. These generator sets may respond to maintenance and tests differently than older generator 
sets from which industry standard maintenance and test policies were developed (Margaroni, 
1999). While there is benefit of extending this research to older generator sets that remain in 
service, such generator sets are rapidly approaching the end of their design lives, and the return 
on investment for data acquisition is greater for newer sets which were anticipated to remain in 
service well into future decades. Answering the research question regarding impact of the age of 
generator sets on reliability required some older units to be included in the study, but the 
emphasis of data acquisition was on units manufactured since 1990. 
The scope of this research also extended to determining the impact of human 
performance on generator set reliability as related to the training level of servicing personnel.  
Specific training of servicing personnel is not typically recorded in maintenance logs, so training 
was categorized as factors of one of three general types: staff collateral duty, staff subject-matter 





with a minimal level of training who are often expected to perform routine low-difficulty 
maintenance and test actions. Both staff and service visit SMEs were assumed to have deep 
understandings of the emergency diesel-electric generator sets at the facility. This study 
examined the interaction between personnel training and the maintenance and test actions 
performed. Knowledge gained from this interaction was anticipated to indicate if total productive 
maintenance (TPM) utilizing operators or facilities staff for simple high-frequency maintenance 
tasks could be as effective for these generator sets as dedicated maintenance personnel and to 
allow managers to quantitatively determine optimal training and manning levels for each facility. 
One aspect that was not within the scope of this study was the cost of the maintenance 
performed. While knowledge of generator set maintenance and test costs would increase the 
usefulness of the findings of this research to cost-sensitive commercial applications, generator 
records maintained by sites do not typically include the associated cost of maintenance or repair 
actions and would pose significantly increased challenges to data acquisition. This research was 
designed to exclusively investigate reliability. This is appropriate for critical operations power 
systems where cost is a secondary concern and for facilities where the cost of maintenance is 
small compared to the financial impact of a loss of power. Economic calculations beyond the 
scope of this research would be required to determine optimal maintenance and test procedures 
for non-critical applications where cost is a primary consideration. The reliability model 
developed by this research will assist managers of emergency diesel-electric generator systems to 
calculate the risk inherent in differing levels of maintenance, tests, and training for their facility, 
and to make risk decisions based upon their own estimated costs. 
A secondary objective of this research was to estimate the operational availability (Ao) 





generator sets. While a very important characteristic, determination of the complete emergency 
power system Ao and Ai includes many variables that fall outside the scope of this research. 
While reliability may be a generalizable property, emergency power system availability is not, 
and there are many challenges to be overcome to accurately determine time to repair. For 
instance, if an emergency generator set receives no maintenance and then suffers an operational 
failure due to a dead battery, is time to repair measured by the number of hours it takes to replace 
the battery after the failure was discovery, or should time to repair include the unknown number 
of months the failure sat hidden? Response time for staff and availability of spare parts varies 
significantly, further complicating generalization. 
Maintenance down-time was not included in the survey form, but, except for fluid 
changes, valve lashing, and other intensive maintenance, none of the maintenance or test actions 
included in the survey require taking the generator out of service or result in operational 
maintenance down-time and have negligible impact on Ao. Inspections and fluid level checks do 
not impede the ability of generator sets to automatically start, and, even if units are switched off 
for worker safety while examining belts and filters, the servicing technicians are available to 
immediately restore the units to operational condition. Only sites with the most comprehensive 
logs contain sufficient information to accurately calculate repair and maintenance downtimes, 
but using these numbers exclusively may have introduced bias. 
  Response and repair time are anticipated to be shorter for failures discovered during 
testing due to technicians being on-site and able to immediately initiate repair actions. The actual 
point a failure occurred was rarely recorded, only when the failure was discovered, and the 
precise time of repair was not always recorded, so any calculations of availability developed 





Availability calculations based exclusively on operational reliability would be inaccurate, 
as they would not consider unavailability during corrective maintenance. The question of 
availability calculation becomes more complicated when considering hidden failures, as it is 
impossible in many cases to know when a failure occurred, only when that failure was 
discovered. Utilization of Fehr (2014) methods to investigate test failures for the purposes of 
availability calculation run the risk of bias against sites with frequent testing. Calculating 
availability is outside the scope of this research. 
 
RELIABILITY PREDICTORS 
Twenty-one maintenance and test predictors proposed by Fehr (2014) were investigated 
in this study, each representing a maintenance or test action with the potential to contribute to 
overall system output. These actions, shown in Table 4, were chosen based on periodicity of one 
year or less per industry recommendations in NFPA 110 (2016) and are of the form: 
 
xi = j, periodicity of each action, where: 
i = action, per Table 4 
j = action periodicity, per Table 5  
 
The periodicity of actions xi were measured in years and modeled as covariates. 
Modeling these actions as factors would have the advantage of independence from any required 
knowledge of the relationship between periodicity and reliability, and would allow for complex 
relationships such as bathtub-shaped hazard functions which prior research indicates may be 
appropriate for some actions. However, modeling these actions as factors with limited data 





covariates to reduce the model to a manageable number of degrees of freedom. Table 5 shows 
each action periodicity j measured in years between maintenance periods. Continuous monitoring 
by watch personnel twenty-four hours a day is approximated as 0.25 hours to reflect response 
time. Continuous monitoring only during the normal forty-hour work week is approximated as a 
mean response time of 15 hours. This mean assumes that while response time may be within 0.25 
hours for forty hours per week, average response time will be eight hours during sixty-four hours 
of weeknights per week, and an average of thirty-two hours response time during the sixty-four 
hours of weekends. The covariate value for actions performed at “More than three years” is 
approximated as five years, and the covariate value for actions marked “Not Routine” is 
approximated as seven years. Hours were converted to days for modeling by dividing by twenty-







Table 4. Table of Test and Maintenance Actions 
i= Test and Maintenance Actions 
1 Maintenance performed, details not known 
2 Check alarms 
3 Check switch & breaker positions 
4 Visual inspection for leaking fluids 
5 Visual inspection of hoses, cables, etc. 
6 Check fuel level 
7 Check oil level 
8 Check coolant level 
9 Check air filter 
10 Battery voltage & physical condition 
11 Check fan belt(s) 
12 Battery resistance or impedance test 
13 Clean unit exterior (including radiator & louvers) 
14 Fuel cleaning (or fluid analysis) 
15 Oil change (or fluid analysis) 
16 Check electrical tightness 
17 Engine intensive maintenance 
18 Generator (electrical) intensive maintenance 
19 Generator set no-load test 
20 Generator set load test on load bank 
21 Generator set load test on operational load 







Table 5.  Table of Test and Maintenance Action Periodicity 
j= Action Periodicity 
0.25 hr continuous watch 
15 hr 40hr/week watch 
1 day Daily 
7 days Weekly 
14 days Biweekly 
1/12 yr Monthly 
¼ yr Quarterly 
½ yr 6-month 
1 yr Annual 
2 yr 2 years 
3 yr 3 years 
5 yr More than 3 years 





The data acquisition framework from Fehr (2014) was used to acquire data from 
operational records of emergency generator systems with diverse maintenance policies. 
Managers and maintainers are asked to provide data on the Fehr (2014) Microsoft Excel form 
included in Appendix A. As maintenance policies and periodicity for a given unit can change 
over time, managers and maintainers were asked to fill out a new form every time maintenance 
periodicity for a generator set changed so that each form contained a period of consistent 
maintenance. Thus, each form represented a rational subgroup of a single specific generator set 
with consistent maintenance and test practices. As an increase in maintenance may be a 
managerial response to failure, regardless of whether maintenance practices played a role in the 
failure, each instance of change in maintenance policy was individually investigated to prevent 
the inadvertent inclusion of bias in the study. The completed and validated forms were compiled 





The United States Department of Defense and other authorities require facilities to keep 
accurate and complete generator set maintenance and operation records from commissioning to 
decommissioning, and the Environmental Protection Agency has the authority to levy fines 
against organizations that do not keep accurate run logs, but logs were often found to be 
incomplete, damaged, or lost. Incomplete data could in some cases be accurately estimated from 
interviews with maintenance personnel and other data. Where data such as this was estimated, it 
was annotated in the comment field. For example, in a few cases it was necessary to estimate 
unknown chronometer run hours at the start of observation period by combining knowledge of 
test periodicity and duration with knowledge about historic power failures. Where only the 
month or year of the generator set installation date was available, it was estimated for regression 
purposes as occurring in the middle of the year or month, and this estimation was annotated in 
the comments field. Where no installation date information was known, the installation date was 
often able to be accurately estimated using information about the building’s construction date or 
extrapolated from chronometer run hours through the known event period. Where a survey form 
was incomplete, and data required for regression analysis could not be accurately estimated, the 
observation was excluded from the database.   
The initiation date of logbooks was often arbitrary, such as the first of the year, or 
whenever the previous logbook was filled up. Earlier logbooks were not always available, so 
logs for many observations were left truncated. While failure data is important, reporting periods 
that do not end in failure are equally as important and were also recorded to avoid introduction of 
bias. The resultant data sets from this data acquisition contained significant amounts of left 





Many critical operations power systems support sensitive mission functions, and specific 
information about facility emergency power systems is often sensitive as well. Care was taken to 
sanitize the data of all identifying information such as site name, location, or function. Where 
site managers provided identifiable descriptive names for generator sets on the survey forms, the 
identifying information was replaced with alternate generic generator name. Likewise, 
descriptive information was removed from the comments field when unit data was imported into 
the database. The database did not include information about any site’s system configuration or 
redundancy; such information is not relevant to the intent of this of research. Instead, a generic 
identification number was assigned to each observation, with the identification key and original 
survey form maintained in a separate database on a secure government server. 
A spreadsheet was developed in Microsoft Excel 2016 to organize the data in a format 
that could be easily exported into R for analysis. To eliminate transcription errors, a Visual Basic 
for Applications script was written to import data from the Excel forms into the spreadsheet. This 
script automatically converted check-box matrices of descriptive predictor periodicities into 
numerical periodicities and generated individual observation entries for each logged failure. The 
data was thoroughly reviewed for completeness and errors, exported in comma-delimited .csv 
format, and imported into R for analysis. 
 
DATA REQUIRED 
This study sought to determine the relationship of many predictors, and two important 
questions that were asked prior to conducting research was how much data was required to 





Some knowledge about the survival distributions of the generator sets was required to 
estimate the amount of data required. Fehr (2014) applied the PREP (TM 5-695-5, 2006) formula 
of λ = [Failures]/[Time] and Reliability R(t) = e-λt, to a sample set of well-maintained generator 
sets, and determined the annual reliability of the sample set of well-maintained generator sets 
was R(1) = 0.931 and λ = 0.074 failures per year. This was a higher reliability than the published 
annual reliability of R(1) = 0.8838 and λ = .1235 failure per year as measured from a diverse data 
set of well, average and poorly-maintained units during the PREP study. The mean and standard 
deviation of an exponentially distributed function can be calculated from this data as µ = σ  = 1 / 
λ, with the results µFEHR = 13.514 and µPREP = 8.097. The hazard rate ratio of the well-maintained 
and average-maintained generator sets Δ can be calculated as 
Δ = (1 / µFEHR) / (1 / µPREP) = 0.599. Data on poorly-maintained units was not available and was 
estimated by extrapolation from the PREP and Fehr data. An extrapolated value of µPOOR = 2.684 
in combination with µFEHR = 13.514 resulted in an estimated average µPREP = 8.097. From this 
extrapolation, the hazard ratio Δ was estimated as Δ = (1 / µFEHR) / (1 / µPOOR) = 0.199.   
Schoenfeld (1983) derived the equation (Zβ + Z1-α)
2 / (PA PB log
2Δ) where Zβ + Z1-α are the 
desired 1 – α and β percentiles of the hazard distribution, PA and PB are the proportion of patients 
randomized to treatments A and B, and Δ is the hazard rate ratio. This method used the log 
hazard ratio to determine the number of deaths (failures) required for statistically significant 
results and did not require knowledge about the distribution beyond the proportionality 
assumption. Schoenfeld (1983) was silent on the impact of censoring and truncation on this 
calculation, but the generator data in this study included a great deal of truncation and censoring. 
The only hazard rate data available pre hoc assumed an exponential distribution and was used for 





indicated 94 failures were required to achieve statistically significant results. Assuming the 
PREP hazard rate of λ = .1235 failure per year was representative of the average generator set 
failure rate, documenting 94 operational failures would require a sample size of 761 standby-
years. With an extrapolated Δ = 0.199 based off the extrapolated µPOOR, however, only 9 failure 
events would be required from a sample size of 72 standby-years. Schoenfeld’s method requires 
the assumption of binary covariates though, which is not entirely applicable to generator set data 
with a spectrum of covariate values. 
Hsieh and Lavori (2007) proposed a variation on the Schoenfeld (1983) equation utilizing 
the variance instead of the sample proportions, (Zβ + Z1-α)
2 / (σ2 log2Δ).  Hsieh and Lavori’s 
(2007) model supports non-binary covariates and was found by Hsieh and Lavori to be 
insensitive to data censoring, although Hsieh and Lavori were silent on the impact of truncation. 
Like Schoenfeld’s method, this method does not require assumptions of the distribution beyond 
the proportional hazard, but this method still requires knowledge of the hazard rates. If the 
acquired data was entirely binary with equal parts 0 and 1, the normalized covariate variance is 
σ2 = 0.25, the same as the value of PA PB  used in Schoenfeld’s equation where PA = PB = 0.50. 
If, however, it is assumed that the distribution of normalized covariates is equally split between 
high-quality maintenance (0), average maintenance (0.5), and poor quality maintenance (1), then 
σ2 = 0.1667. Including this variance into Hseih and Lavori’s equation indicates 141 failures are 
required for Δ = 0.599 and 18 for Δ = 0.199. Assuming that the PREP hazard rate of λ = 0.1235 
failure per year is representative of the average of this study, documenting 141 operational 
failures would require a sample size of 1142 standby-years. Documenting 18 operational failures 





Hseih and Lavori’s method is more appropriate than Schoenfeld’s method for estimating 
the data required for this study. The exact amount of data required depends on the covariates of 
the acquired data, but the amount of data required to achieve statistically significant results was 
estimated pre hoc to be achievable with as little as 72 standby years of data if the right samples 
were found. Acquisition of 1000-2000 standby years of data was anticipated for this study, which 
was anticipated to achieve statistically significant results for at least one research question.  
 
COX/WEIBULL REGRESSION TECHNIQUE 
The Cox (1972) proportional hazards regression model was developed by Cox to 
represent survival as a function of time. One complication for the application to emergency 
diesel-electric generator sets is that there are multiple ways that time can be measured, including 
the calendar time in service and the run hours of the unit. While Hale and Arno (2009) assumed 
an exponential survival distribution based on calendar time in service when creating their model 
of generator set reliability, there is no existing research to show which way to measure time is 
the most appropriate. Elapsed calendar time since manufacture Tage is one of the ways in which 
time can be measured. However, this presents difficulties within the methods available for this 
analysis, and appropriately addressing Tage within the model was one of the earliest and most 
difficult problems dealt with by Fehr (2014) in developing the methods used for this research. 
 One of challenges in utilizing Tage as the Cox survival function time variable is the 
repairable nature of the system and potential for each unit to suffer failure multiple times over its 
operational life and the restoration of condition by repair. The original Cox function (Cox, 1972) 
does not have a mechanism for multiple deaths (failures); it treats mortality as an event that 





Successive failures beyond the first cannot be entered into a Cox regression utilizing Tage 
as the time variable without erroneous results. Assuming an average failure rate of λ = .1235 
failures per year as found by PREP (TM 5-695-5, 2006), the average generator set from that 
study may have accumulated three failures over a twenty-five-year period. Every operational 
failure has operational impact regardless of the age of the generator set that failed, and restricting 
this study to only the first operational failure could bias results, so it is appropriate that this 
methodology can analyze multiple failures of each unit throughout its operational life. The 
methodology must be capable of handling significant amounts of left truncation and right 
censorship to analyze data which often has arbitrary start and end dates. 
Multiple methods have been developed to adapt the Cox function for recurring or 
multiple events (Amorim & Cai, 2015; Hosmer, Lemeshow, & May, 2008; Kalbfleisch & 
Prentice, 2002; Kelly & Lim, 2000; Andersen & Gill, 1982), but these methods can only be 
applied to a right-continuous process that represents everything that happens up to time t 
(Andersen & Gill, 1982) and cannot be applied to left truncated data such as required for this 
research. 
Fehr (2014) proposed a different method using Cox’s non-parametric distribution. Fehr 
(2014) proposed this method because the data was anticipated to have a high degree of left 
truncation and a high degree of right censorship and because the baseline hazard model for 
generator set reliability was not known and Cox’s non-parametric model does not require any 
assumption of baseline hazard model be made (Cox, 1972). However, some assumptions are 
required to use Cox’s model to analyze generator set reliability. One assumption required to 
apply Cox’s model to a multiple mortality application is the assumption of an exponential 





Under this assumption, the time variable may be reset following each failure or change in 
maintenance periodicity; the number of starts in the reporting period ns is reset to zero, the time 
in service in the reporting period t is reset to zero, and the run hours in the reporting period Trt is 
reset to zero. For the first failure of each unit, t = Tage, but for subsequent failures, attempting to 
use Tage would result in invalid regression results as Cox’s model would interpret it not as a 
single individual suffering multiple failures, but as multiple individuals with increasingly long 
survival life. Therefore, Tage cannot be directly used as a time variable in this method, but Tage 
can be included as a covariate predictor to retain incorporation of generator set age in the model. 
Similarly, the total cumulative run hours Trtfv can also be included as a covariate predictor. Both 
generator set age Tage and total cumulative run hours Trtfv are time dependent properties, but the 
end of the observation period is a fixed point in the record, so age and run hours at the end of the 
observation period can be treated as static time independent covariates in the Cox (1972) 
regression. These properties change over the operational life of the generator set, but selecting 
record entry and exit points for the regression permits inclusion of observations taken at any 
point in time. 
 Due to the impact of corrective repairs and data truncation in real world data sets, the 
structure of the analysis requires the assumption that emergency diesel-electric generator systems 
exhibit exponential base hazard rate characteristics so that random or arbitrary starting points for 
each data set can yield valid results. The Cox non-parametric distribution does not require any 
assumption of baseline hazard model be made for the regression calculations, but only a failure 
model with a constant failure rate function can tolerate data sets with random or arbitrary start 
and stop times and still generate valid results. Inclusion of generator set age Tage and total 





introduces additional error and degrees of freedom into the model, but permits Cox regression 
analysis despite long-term trending over multiple failure events.   
 Inclusion of the generator set age Tage and cumulative run hours Trtfv as covariate 
predictors had two advantages. The first advantage is that it allowed inclusion of these predictors 
in the model despite the assumption of an exponential distribution. The second advantage is that 
it freed the model from the requirement to treat these variables as linear. As covariates, these 
predictors could be included into the model as logarithmic, linear, exponential, or other complex 
relationships, even within an exponential parametric regression that would normally have a 
constant failure rate λ. Representing the generator set age covariate βageTage as the transformed 
function 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 +⁡𝛽𝑎𝑔𝑒log⁡(𝑇𝑎𝑔𝑒) has the same mathematical response within the model as a 
Weibull base hazard rate function. The same is true for Trtfv. Other transforms may represent 
other distributions, although Weibull is the distribution most often associated with engine and 
mechanical wear-out. This technique allows the resultant Cox nonparametric proportional 
hazards model to simultaneously exhibit characteristics of an exponential distribution and 
Weibull distribution with respect to long-term generator set age and cumulative run-hours, and in 
this case produced a much higher quality model than an exponential base hazard rate alone. 
Thus, even though a parametric model using this technique will have a constant base hazard rate 
λ0, the hazard rate h(t|xi) calculated for each unit for any point in time can include complicated 
interactions and non-linear relationships.  
 Equation 3 shows the Cox regression expression representing the log of generator set 







𝛽𝑛𝑥𝑛:= 𝛽𝑎𝑔𝑒log⁡(𝑇𝑎𝑔𝑒) (3) 
log(ℎ(𝑡|𝑥𝑖)) = log⁡(ℎ0(𝑡)) + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑥𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 + 𝜀 (4) 
 
 
  Equation 5 shows the Weibull baseline hazard function where Tage is age, m is the shape 
parameter and η is the scale parameter. Equation 6 shows this expression transformed 
algebraically via logarithm into an expression similar to the form used in Cox’s proportional 

















If Equation 6 is transformed into to the same notation as a typical Cox covariate by 
substituting βT := m - 1, xT := log(Tage), and log(h0) := log(m) + mlog(η), as in Equation 7, it is 
clear that the expression relating Weibull’s hazard function based on age is fundamentally no 
different than any other regression covariate. In fact, including log(T) as a predictor is 
mathematically equal to Weibull’s hazard function and retains the time-dependent properties of 
this hazard function without violating the assumption of an exponential baseline hazard model. 
 
 








Substituting this transformed Weibull expression of the time covariate in as the baseline 
hazard function in the Cox proportional hazards model of Equation 4 reveals the form of a 
standard exponential parametric hazard distribution shown in Equation 8, or, as used in this 




logℎ(𝑡|𝑥𝑖) = log⁡(ℎ0) + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑥𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 + 𝛽𝑇𝑥𝑇 + 𝜀 (8) 
logℎ(𝑡|𝑥𝑖) = log⁡(ℎ0) + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑥𝑖
𝑛






 In this way, t may be utilized as the regression time variable for each observation period 
with arbitrary start time set to 0 while simultaneously retaining any Weibull hazard distribution 
contribution related to the true age of the generator set. As the Cox log likelihood estimation 
algorithm only utilizes the final event or truncation time, substituting a fixed value of Tage for 
each observation in place of the normally unconstrained Weibull time variable is valid and does 
not bias results. Any number of time-dependent variables can be included in the Cox regression 
in this manner, permitting quantitative calculation of complex systems with multiple independent 
time dependencies. 
Including the transformed Weibull expression as a covariate predictor in a parametric 
proportional hazards model with a nominal exponential base hazard rate results in a distribution 
displaying aspects of multiple exponential and Weibull distributions. This parametric model can 
be represented as a model with both exponential and Weibull base hazard rates. The Weibull 
shape parameter m can be calculated from the βT values returned by nonparametric Cox 





log(T), the scale parameter can be calculated from the parametric regression results. If multiple 
time-dependent predictors of the form log(T) are included in the regression, the Weibull scale 
parameters become conflated into the h0 scalar and are not as easily separated. This still results in 
a useful model, as the individual contributions of each constituent component remain included in 
the resultant hazard function. Hazard curves may be calculated from this model by Cox (1972) 
methods. 
One weakness of this method is that the limit as T approaches zero increases 
logarithmically over a very short time spans and becomes infinite at log(0). This could lead to 
over-estimations in survival functions for samples where T=0. Because of this, time values must 
be constrained or transformed so that T > 0. 
Rodriguez (2010) showed that a regression model consisting of a single covariate of the 
form log(t) is a special case where the proportional hazards model multiplied by an accelerated 
life expression yields the same result as an accelerated life model multiplied by a proportional 
hazard expression. This relationship is does not hold when multiple time dependent covariates 
are added into the models, and is not otherwise similar to the methods herein, but did recognize a 
connection between a covariate of the form log(t) and the Weibull distribution.  
 
DELIMINATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS 
This study assumed prime and standby rated generators in emergency service share a 
common response to test and maintenance periodicity and can be directly compared. This 
assumption was based upon the common practice of de-rating a standby generator by ten percent 
and labeling it as a prime-rated generator. This assumption may have increased the error of 





This study assumed data gathered will be accurate and not tampered with, filtered, or 
otherwise corrupted by maintenance personnel trying to hide mistakes or lapses in proscribed 
maintenance or tests. Failures attributable to human error may be entered in official logs as an 
equipment failure or an unknown failure by unscrupulous personnel and would be 
indistinguishable from actual equipment failures by this methodology. As this study was looking 
at aggregated failures of all causes and was largely blind to specific cause attribution, impact 
from misattribution of failures was anticipated to have minimal negative impact on study results. 
However, the methods used were not capable of determining whether maintenance and tests were 
performed, only that records indicate they were performed.  This aspect could potentially bias 
results if widespread falsification of records occurred. 
This study assumed that historic maintenance records were accurately interpreted and that 
the survey form was consistently understood and reported. All survey forms were reviewed for 
completeness and consistency with past records prior to incorporation into the study database. 
This study assumed the quality of maintenance was consistent between sites of similar 
personnel training and maintenance and test periodicity. As training and personnel qualifications 
and competency varied, the quality of maintenance performed may also have varied. This 
methodology had no means with which to gauge maintenance quality beyond the general training 
category of servicing personnel. 
It was assumed that diesel-electric generator sets adapted for use as spark-ignition natural 
gas generator sets and otherwise sharing identical parts shared identical characteristics and 






IV.  ANALYSIS 
 
DATA 
One thousand two hundred and eighty one (1,281) standby-years of generator set data 
was acquired for this research from 239 generator sets, capturing 58 operational failures from 
40,161 run-hours of operation. This data was provided from multiple sources including the 
Department of Defense and commercial providers of maintenance and repair services. The 
sample population size exceeded the anticipated minimum 1142 standby-year size, but the 58 
operational failure events within that data was much smaller than the 141 operational failures 
anticipated to be required to achieve for significant results. This appears to be due to the sample 
population of Department of Defense and commercially maintained units in this study to be 
much more reliable than anticipated based on previous findings by PREP (TM 5-695-5, 2006) or 
the small scale study in Fehr (2014). 
The sample population included generator sets between 10kW and 2000kW with a 
324kW mean generator set rating. A bubble chart depicting the distribution of data from different 
size units is shown in Figure 3; the small bubbles represent right-censored observations and the 
large bubbles represent observations ending in operational failure.   
The oldest generator sets in this study were 43 years old, and five were older than 35 
years, but the mean age of generator set in this study was 11.2 years. The mean age of generator 
sets experiencing operational failures was 12.2 years. Figure 4 shows a summary of generator set 












Most generator sets in this sample population received regular maintenance and could be 
considered well or very well maintained. Few records were obtained of generators receiving little 
or no maintenance, as reliable records proved difficult to obtain. To avoid the introduction of 
selection bias, generator sets whose records were only available because a failed generator was 
repaired were excluded. Only records for subpopulations believed to be free of selection bias 
were included. A portion of the generator sets included in the sample population of this study 
were units where maintenance contracts lapsed due to financial constraints and were later 
renewed, permitting complete and accurate knowledge of the maintenance history of these units 
even though no logs were recorded during the period of no maintenance. The only generator sets 
in this study receiving no maintenance or testing at all were four 600kW generator sets in a new 
building that were installed without being configured for automatic exercise and with no 





the exerciser was not functioning during a period of lapsed maintenance. In the other cases with 
lapsed maintenance, automatic engine exercisers continued providing weekly no-load tests 









Maintenance records often listed component failures without clarity on whether the 
failure occurred during a test or during operation. Descriptions like, “generator failed to start 
during outage,” were clear, but other descriptions were not always easily interpretable. It was 
generally assumed that records stating, “unit is alarming” referred to test failures while 
“generator did not start” referred to operational failures unless occurring during a scheduled 
maintenance visit. Dispatch personnel of one company indicated electronic maintenance records 





system did not make a distinction when repair orders were called in. Test failure information was 
not collected for most units, but frequent test failures were noted anecdotally by the research 
team while reviewing maintenance logs; a thorough review of one subpopulation deemed typical 
found test failures occurred at a rate of 14:3 compared to operational failures. 
 
INITIAL ANALYSIS 
Analysis began with the Cox log likelihood regression model shown in Equation 1, where 
xi represented the covariate predictors in Table 4, xbi represented the training factors of the 
servicing personnel, and βi and βbi represented the regression coefficients. Make, model, age, run 
hours, capacity, load, and the predictors in Table 1 were included in the initial regression model. 
Training was not initially included, as it was intended as an interaction component to be 
combined with a performed maintenance or test action. The event response was the operational 
failure Boolean indicator Fov. The periodicity of maintenance and test action predictors in Table 
4 was measured in years or fraction of a year. These predictors were treated as covariates with 
logarithmic and second order predictors tested for significant predictors to determine the 
mathematical relationship to failure, especially for complicated relationships where failure rates 
may not only increase with too little maintenance but also with too frequent maintenance.   
  The regression was performed independently using time t and run-hours Trt as the time 
variable. There was insufficient data available on the number of starts ns to include ns as a time 
variable. The number of starts was determined to largely be a function of test periodicity within 
the sample population and was excluded from the regression model as these predictors were 
already included. The Fehr (2014) framework included a normalized weighted time function, 





reliability as a function of time in standby service, the number of starts, and run hours. 
Statistically significant models were developed using standby time t, but no statistically 
significant models using time as run-hours Trt were found, leaving standby time t as the only 
significant time variable. It was concluded from this result that calendar time in emergency 
standby duty is a more appropriate metric for time than cumulative run hours. Weights were set 
as ωt = 1, ωn = 0, and ωT =0, and so tw(t,ns,Trt) = t. 
To remove left truncation of prior failures and the associated bias, time was normalized 
as t = 0 for the start of each observation period and counted in years to the end of each 
observation period. This was necessary for truncated records as the regression would otherwise 
assume the generator set had operated to that point since installation without failure, and it would 
create bias in the regression. Run hours were likewise set as Trt = 0 at the start of the observation 
and counted in run hours accumulated to the end of the observation. Time t and run hours Trt 
were reset to 0 for the next observation following each failure event. This method was 
independently developed by Fehr (2014) but is similar to the method proposed by Thomas and 
Reyes (2014) for Cox regression models with time-dependent covariates. This method removes 
evidence of left truncation from the observation record, but any potential time-dependent 
relationship was preserved by the inclusion of the age covariate log(Tage) and run hours covariate 
log(Trtfv) in the model as regression covariates. This further permitted analysis of other orders of 
these predictors and permitted analysis of complex relationships independent of any 
assumptions. As shown in Chapter III, inclusion of log(Tage) and log(Trtfv) as covariates is 
mathematically identical to inclusion as Weibull base hazard rates, and the contributions of each 
to the model can be calculated directly from a standard Cox regression. Thus, this initial model 





Weibull functions, and the other maintenance, test, and generator set property predictors. An 
additional factor, xsrc, was included to test for bias from the data source. The initial model tested 
is shown in Equation 10. 
 
 
log ℎ({𝑡}|𝑥𝑖) = log⁡(ℎ0({𝑡})) +∑𝛽𝑖𝑥𝑖
22
𝑖=1
+ 𝛽𝑚𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑀𝑎𝑘𝑒 + 𝛽𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 + 𝛽𝑘𝑊𝑘𝑊




The statistical software package, R, with the survival and eha packages (Broström, 2011) 
was selected for this analysis as it supports Cox and parametric regression models and includes 
functions insensitive to left truncation and right censorship. Data was analyzed using the 
functions surv, coxph, coxreg, cox.zph, resid, and survfit, as well as plot, summary, and other 
standard R tools. The coxph function was used for bidirectional stepwise regression as it was 
more tolerant of poorly fitting data than coxreg, and coxreg was used to generate log likelihood 
values to compare the best fitting models. The cox.zph function was used to test the 
proportionality assumption and the resid function to analyze the residuals. Bidirectional stepwise 
regression was used beginning with the log likelihood regression model shown in Equation 10. 
Backwards stepwise regression was used iteratively to eliminate the least significant predictors 
from the model. Forward stepwise regression was then used to add predictors back into the 
model one at a time to ensure none were erroneously removed. Bidirectional stepwise regression 
was further used to investigate other combinations of predictors, with predictors chosen based on 





via backward stepwise regression until the regression results converged. Once the regression 
results converged, the least significant predictors were removed one at a time through backward 
stepwise regression until all remaining predictors were significant. The log likelihood method 
was used in conjunction with p-tests to determine the most appropriate model. The initial 
regression model was also analyzed with the stepAIC function of the MASS package (Ripley, 
2017) with identical results. As very few predictors were found to be significant, the use of more 
sophisticated operations research methods for model building like simulated annealing and 
Markov-chain Monte Carlo analysis was not utilized.  
After the model in Equation 2 was reduced to only contain significant predictors, the 
second order interactions of Equation 1 were added by forward stepwise regression including 
interactions between test and maintenance predictors and interactions with the training 
predictors. Alternatives to log(Tage) and log(Trtfv) were tested via substitution and forward 
stepwise regression to eliminate assumptions of mathematical relationship, including log(log(T)), 
T, T2, and eT. 
This model was then fitted to a parametric model via piecewise constant hazard analysis 
to determine the baseline hazard function value. 
 
COX REGRESSION ANALYSIS RESULTS 
Cox regression analysis using the coxph and coxreg functions in R found the two Weibull 
predictors for age log(Tage) and run hours log(Trtfv) to be statistically significant in nearly all 
interim and final models with p < 0.01 in the most significant models. Five maintenance 
predictors, x12, x13, x16, x17, and x18 were found to be significant with p < 0.1 when combined with 





control factor for source xsrc. However, none of these predictors were found to be significant 
when applied in any combination except one-at-a-time in a model with log(Tage) and log(Trtfv). 
Nor were any training predictors found to be significant in combination with these predictors. 
Further investigation revealed a large degree of conflation between x12, x13, x16, x17, and x18, as 
well as some potential conflation with kW, xL, and xsrc. This was due to a large portion of the data 
coming from either Department of Defense sources which had some variance in periodicity but 
were still largely homogenous or third-party contractors which also had some variance in 
periodicity of some maintenance items, but were even more homogenous. The predictors that 
showed the highest significance in the regression were the predictors that had the largest 
differences in periodicity between these two sources. 
Two new variables were created to adjust for this conflation to represent different 
archetypes of the conflated predictors, with x23 representing the shortest periodicity of touch 
labor of any sort and x24 representing the shortest periodicity of any type of generator run test. 
Two new accompanying training predictors xb23 and xb24 were also created. Training predictors 
x23 and x24 were found not to be significant; however the accompanying training predictors xb23 
and xb24 were both found to be significant in interim models for staff subject-matter expert 
maintenance and tests. No statistically significant difference was found between site visit 
subject-matter expert maintenance and staff collateral duty maintenance for this data. This raised 
the question: is the mere presence of a staff subject-matter expert as or more important than the 
periodicity of maintenance that subject-matter expert performs, or is something else occurring? 
An in-depth review of the data revealed that the training factors were highly conflated 
with the most significant predictors, and that the significance of the maintenance predictors 





The maintenance predictor for electrical tightness x16 had the highest predictor significance and 
overall model quality in interim models and was selected for the final model. No failures related 
to electrical tightness maintenance were observed in any unit of the sample population in tests or 
operation, but this predictor was nevertheless found significant in the Cox model with 
p = 0.0469. This indicator is not only highly conflated with the training predictor xb23, but also 
reflects the largest difference in periodicity between units maintained by staff subject-matter 
experts and units maintained by contractors.  Every site with a staff subject-matter expert 
performed this maintenance at least annually, while very few sites without staff subject-matter 
experts performed it at all. This predictor may not have significance from indicating the 
periodicity of electrical tightness, but significance from reflecting the level of overall generator 
maintenance intensity, allowing it to effectively act as an analogue representing a combination of 
maintenance, testing, and training.   
Generator set size kW was statistically significant in an interim model with just log(Tage), 
log(Trtfv), but with both kW and x16 in the model, the statistical significance of generator set size 
reduced to outside of the the α error threshold, indicating a degree of conflation and risk of Type 
1 error. This may be due to stratification and bias in the data, as the mean contractor-maintained 
units in this study tended to be smaller than the mean units maintained by staff subject-matter 
experts. Correlating against the training indicator for x16, xb16, the average size of staff subject-
matter expert generator sets was 770kW in the data acquired while the average size of service 
visit subject-matter expert was 233kW. No statistically significant relationship between 
generator set reliability and generator size was found in the Cox regression analysis aside from 
one incomplete interim model. There is insufficient evidence to suggest generator size is a 





Generator set load was statistically significant in a model with just log(Tage), log(Trtfv), 
and xL, but with both xL and x16 in to the model, the statistical significance of generator set load 
reduced to outside of the α error threshold, indicating a degree of conflation.  This may due to 
stratification of the data and a degree of conflation with x16 as most contractor-maintained units 
in this study utilized automatic weekly no-load tests where xL = 0kW and reduced the mean load 
of the subpopulation, while few sites with staff subject-matter experts ran no-load tests and most 
only ran monthly load tests. Correlating against the training indicator for x16, xb16, the average 
loading of staff subject-matter expert generator sets was 12% in the data acquired, while the 
average loading of contractor maintained size was 2%. These numbers are unlikely to be 
accurate, as accurate load data was difficult to obtain for many generator sets, especially for 
those units whose history was compiled by contractor maintenance records that did not include 
information about facility load. These units all utilized regular no-load tests, so typical loads 
were approximated as 0% when this maintenance data was imported into the database. However, 
the actual average load should be higher since these generators support their facilities during 
utility outages and the facilities are unlikely to be at 0% load. There were reports noted 
anecdotally during data acquisition as indications of wet stacking of some lightly-loaded units, 
but no clear statistically significant relationship between generator set reliability and generator 
set load was found in the Cox regression analysis of this data.  
Sensitivity analysis was performed on the data with six different test data sets eliminating 
certain subgroups or injecting erroneous failures to determine if the strong statistical significance 
of log(Tage) and log (Trtfv) from the regression may be resulting from failed repair attempts or the 
relatively small number of older generators. Regression tests were performed after removing all 





than six months, and by changing the status of data from some of the oldest units from censored 
to failure, but the regression relationships varied little during this sensitivity analysis. This 
increases confidence that the relationships determined by the Cox regression exist in the sample 
population and are not purely statistical chance.  
The resultant Cox model selected from the analysis is show in Equation 11 and includes 








The proportionality assumption was tested on Equation 11 utilizing the cox.zph 
proportionality test function and resid residuals function which validated the proportionality 
assumption. The regression functions, test results, residuals, and survival fits associated with the 
analysis are shown in Appendix B. 
Predictor significance is presented in Table 6 as a listing of the Wald p-values of each 
predictor when added as a fourth predictor to the model of Equation 11 and as a replacement for 
x16. Different order time predictors replaced the Weibull component were also tested, either as an 
additional predictor or as a replacement for the relevant time predictor. For the special cases of 
log(Tage) and log(Trtfv), the other time predictor was removed from the model. Predictors with 
significance within α ≤ 0.10 are notated with *.  Predictors selected for the final model are 
notated with **. 
The survival fit of the Cox regression using mean covariate values is shown in Figure 5. 





computations, the survfit function plot treats both log(Tage) and log(Trtfv) as static covariates 
based on the sample population mean. The survfit function assumes all generator sets are 
eternally 12.4 years old with 395 run hours, and does not accurately represent the time 
dependency of these covariates. This issue will be addressed in greater depth during the 
parametric regression analysis.  
 
 
Table 6. Table of Predictor Significance When Added to or Replacing a Potentially Conflated 












x1 0.751 0.971 
 
x19 0.504 0.306 
x2 0.914 0.897 
 
x20 0.742 0.157 
x3 0.931 0.833 
 
x21 0.896 0.106 
x4 0.934 0.83 
 
x22 0.993 0.101 
x5 0.931 0.833 
 
x23 0.867 0.658 
x6 0.871 0.661 
 
x24 0.873 0.847 
x7 0.871 0.661 
 
xb23 0.233 0.078* 
x8 0.871 0.661 
 
xb24 0.243 0.078* 
x9 0.872 0.666 
 
kW 0.506 0.094* 
x10 0.872 0.666 
 
xL 0.173 0.062* 
x11 0.866 0.657 
 
xsrc 0.434 0.039* 
x12 0.565 0.048* 
 
log(log(Tage)) 0.678 0.0008* 
x13 0.731 0.086* 
 
log(Tage) 0.000018** 0.0004* 
x14 0.606 0.107 
 
Tage 0.313 0.0096* 
x15 0.752 0.905 
 
log(log(Trtfv)) 0.236 0.026* 
x16 0.047** N/A 
 
log(Trtfv) 0.007** 0.023* 
x17 0.572 0.059* 
 
Trtfv 0.379 0.025* 
x18 0.572 0.059* 
 











PARAMETRIC REGRESSION ANALYSIS, FULL MODEL 
This study required the assumption of an exponential base hazard rate to permit Cox 
regression analysis of multiple-failure systems. While Weibull base hazard rates are supported 
within this method, h0 must be a constant, h0 = λ. This delimitation permitted taking the Cox 








This hazard rate is time dependent due to the Weibull relationships of log(Tage) and 
log(Trtfv). As time t as used in the Cox regression is not in this equation, the arbitrary measure of 
time and arbitrary establishments of t = 0 as used in the Cox regression have little meaning. A 



























more meaningful unit of measurement for the parametric model is absolute time from the 
original installation of the generator, Tage = 0. Therefore, in the parametric mathematical model 
Tage = t, it can be represented with t. Run hours Trtfv is time dependent as well, and it will never 
decrease over time, but Trtfv is not necessarily linear. The mean annual run-time in the sample 
population was 31.2 hours per year, but this differs randomly from year to year and from 
different test periodicities. Different run hours are explored later in the discussion, but Trtfv was 
approximated for this analysis as related to the mean annual run-time for the sample population 
multiplied by the generator set age, Trtfv = 31.2Tage. This approximation permits further 
development of this parametric equation into the more standard time dependent form in Equation 









The presence of two time-dependent Weibull predictors log(Tage) and log(Trtfv) in the 
model pose challenges for parametric regression as standard tools like the phreg function in R 
are not structured to deal with repairable systems. The parametric regression must use Equation 
12 to develop regression coefficients, but simultaneously use Equation 13 to fit the parametric 
model to the data. None of the techniques proposed by Thomas and Reyes (2014) or Fehr (2014) 
yielded accurate results due to the inability of the function to accurately model Tage and Trtfv as 
time dependent variables. The phreg function extensions required for parametric regression this 





and while the parametric regression results from phreg returned very similar predictor 
coefficients as the Cox non-parametric regression, phreg was unable to accurately fit h0(t) to the 
data due to function limitations, resulting in nonsensical hazard rates and an extremely poor fit to 
the actual data.   
It was instead chosen to apply a piece-wise constant hazard model in Microsoft Excel 
which effectively permitted treating the complex relationship as a summation series of standard 
exponential distribution expressions. This method leveraged the predictor coefficients returned 
by the Cox model and allowed the iterative fitting of h0(t) values to the data until a good fit was 
achieved. As this methodology had an underlying assumption of an exponential distribution, it 
was assumed that h0(t) = λ, with a single value of λ for all populations. The only variable left 
unsolved in h(t) is λ. A piece-wise constant hazard parametric model was constructed using 
Equation 13 and the Cox (1972) survival equations. The following equations were used to build a 











𝑅(𝑡) = 𝑒−ℎ(𝑡) 
 





To fit the model to the data, the sample population data was stratified into two 
subpopulations based upon existing stratification of x16, one subpopulation with x16 = 7 years and 





maintenance by Fehr (2014). The mean value of x16 for the latter subpopulation was 0.45 years.  
Sample mean time between failures MTBF = Σ t / Σ Fov  = 20.7961 years as calculated from the 
raw data for the subpopulation with x16 = 7 years, and 60.2178 for the subpopulation where 
x16 < 7 years. The equation Rdata = e
-1/MTBF yields an estimation of 98.4% and 95.3% reliability for 
each respective subpopulation. These values were compared to the average reliability R(t) of the 
time-dependent model, which was weighted by a histogram function of the age of the generators 
in the sample pool. Values for λ were iteratively selected to minimize the variance between the 
model prediction for the two subpopulations and the sample MTBF. A value of λ = 0.00696 was 
found to yield the best model fit using these reliability estimators. The final parametric model, 
where t represents the age of the generator set in years, is shown in Equation 14. The hazard 
function values for the two subpopulations are plotted in Figure 6 for comparison. The survival 































This model yielded a weighted average annual reliability for x16 = 7 years of 94.7% 
compared to the sample subpopulation net annual reliability of 95.3%. This model yielded a 
weighted average annual reliability for x16 = 0.45 of 98.9% compared to the x16 ≤ 1 sample 
subpopulation net annual reliability of 98.4%. 
The fitted models were visually compared to the Nelson-Aalen estimators (Müller, 2004) 
for goodness-of-fit and were found to be consistent with the data. The Nelson-Aalen estimators 
were calculated in Microsoft Excel using a Boolean summation algorithm with record lengths 
rounded up to the next whole year. The data was stratified by x16 = 7 and x16 ≤ 1 and the Nelson-
Aalen curves are shown in Figure 9 and Figure 10. The Nelson-Aalen curves did not reflect as 
many early deaths as the infant mortality curve of log(Tage) plots would indicate, but instead 
reflected relatively linear rates with sudden knees and low failure rates for older units. Using 
Microsoft Excel to fit a curve to match the shape of the Nelson-Aalen plot for x16 = 7 yielded a 





R2 = 0.83 and logarithmic trendline fit yielded an R2 = 0.81. Despite having similar R2 values, 
these two trendlines had opposite shaped concave and convex curves. Trendlines fitted by 
Microsoft Excel to the x16 ≤ 1 sample subpopulation yielded lower R
2 values, with a maximum 
R2 = 0.71 for logarithmic and 0.47 for linear. Microsoft Excel would not fit an exponential curve 
for this data set. In both cases, the logarithmic curve was observed to have a shape closely 
resembling the model cumulative distribution function; in the case of x16 ≤ 1 the scale was also 
similar, and the plot nearly identically matched the cumulative distribution function. 
One interesting aspect of this model is that the two most significant predictors, log(Tage) 
and log(Trtfv), were found to have opposite signs. This model predicted generator sets will 
become more reliable with age, but less reliable with more run-hours. The combination of these 
two predictors resulted in relatively static hazard functions once past the infant mortality stage, 
and helps explain the observed low failure rate of older generator sets while remaining consistent 
with logical expectations that generator sets approaching manufacturer design limits of 
























PARAMETRIC REGRESSION ANALYSIS, SIMPLIFIED MODEL 
The Cox (1972) parametric proportional hazard model combining one exponential and 
two Weibull base hazard rate relationships resulted in a high quality model fits this data well, but 
there is potential benefit to also investigating a simpler model that could be more easily applied 
to practical engineering problems and might better benefit non-academics more interested in 
practical use of this research than the pure science and mathematics driving it. Therefore, a 
simplified time-independent model was developed without log(Tage) or log(Trtfv) and compared to 
the full model. One immediate benefit of the simplified model is that removal of the time 
dependent predictors permitted standard functions in R to be used. The Cox regression in coxreg 
in R of the simplified model function with x16 as the only predictor was significant at p = 0.084 
for covariate x16 and p = 0.0325 for the model with a model maximum log likelihood of -279.75. 
This was much lower quality than the model in Equation 12, but still significant with α ≤ 0.10 
and of a form that can be analyzed in R using standard functions. This simplified model from 
coxreg is shown in Equations 15 and 16.  The parametric model from phreg is shown in Equation 
17 and Figure 11. The goodness of fit of this model is shown in Figure 12. The Cox regression 
using run hours as time yielded an identical model; the full regression information, 




ln ℎ(𝑡|𝑥𝑖) = ln⁡(ℎ0(𝑡)) + 0.199𝑥16 (15) 
lnℎ(𝑡|𝑥𝑖) = ℎ0(𝑡)𝑒
0.199𝑥16 (16) 








Figure 11.  Simplified model parametric functions. 
 
 








The simplified model yielded an exponential failure distribution with a constant hazard 
rate of λ = 0.01161. When applied to the weighted reliability piecewise-constant hazard model 
developed for the full model, the results had less variance from sample MTBF than the full 
model. The simplified model predicted an annual reliability of 95.4% for x16 = 7 years compared 
to the sample subpopulation annual reliability of 95.3%. This model yielded a weighted average 
annual reliability of 98.8% for x16 ≤ 1 year compared to the sample sub population net annual 
reliability of 98.4%. The full and simplified model returned very similar values for the x16 ≤ 1 
subpopulation, 98.9% and 98.8% respectively, but much larger differences between values for 
the x16 = 7 subpopulation, 94.7% and 95.4% respectively.   
The visual comparison of the hazard functions of the full and simplified models in Figure 
13 reveals the time dependency of the comparison. The full model and simplified model may 
have yielded similar results for averages of large blocks of generator sets, but the hazard function 
and reliability predictions differed by considerable amounts, especially for younger and older 









Figure 13. Generator reliability parametric model stratified hazard function values, Full Model 







V.  RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
The data acquired for this study revealed a sample population with fewer operational 
failures and much higher reliability than was anticipated from prior research. The sample 
population was found to have maintenance practices falling loosely into two stratified 
subpopulations, each with a large degree of homogeneity. The maintenance of Department of 
Defense units differed with some respects, but were still largely maintained following 
Department of Defense standards with monthly load tests and frequent maintenance intervals. 
The contractor-maintained generator sets were also largely homogenous with nearly every unit 
receiving an automated weekly no-load test and a contractor visit with a periodicity of one to six 
months. Nearly all units received what could be categorized as good, very good, or excellent 
maintenance, and failure rates were lower than anticipated. Statistically significant relationships 
with reliability could not be determined for all predictors. 
Two predictors stood out as the most highly significant, the log of generator age log(Tage) 
and the log of generator cumulative run hours log(Trftv). These predictors both exhibit Weibull 
base hazard rate characteristics in the parametric proportional hazards model and suggest 
generator sets experience elevated infant mortality levels but become more reliable with age, 
although less reliable at higher run hours. 
Interim model test results and data analysis suggested a high degree of conflation existed 
between many of the maintenance and test predictors within the sample population. The interim 
model test results also suggested conflation between several maintenance and test predictors and 
generator set size and load. The most significant predictors in the interim models were battery 





xL. Investigation of the data found x12 and x16 were largely conflated with each other and also 
with xsrc.  When paired together in a single model, x12 and x16 yielded nearly equal and opposite 
coefficients. Two new predictors were created to be generic analogues of the most frequent touch 
maintenance periodicity of any type x23 and most frequent test periodicity of any type x24, but 
neither of these predictors were found to be significant. However, the associated training 
predictors xb23 and xb24 were found to be significant, but only when analyzed independently of 
the maintenance and test periodicity predictors. This was unexpected as these predictors were 
intended to exclusively be interaction modifiers to the maintenance and test predictors, and not 
standalone predictors, but the statistical significance as a standalone predictor in the regression 
suggested the presence of a staff subject-matter expert performing tasks at any periodicity 
increased reliability compared to collateral duty staff or subject-matter expert site visits. No 
statistically significant difference was noted between collateral duty staff and subject-matter 
expert site visits, but all sites in the sample population with collateral duty staff also relied 
heavily on subject-matter expert site visits, so this lack of difference may reflect conflation 
between these two predictors and not equivalence.  
Deeper analysis revealed a very high level of conflation between xb23, xb24, xsrc and 
electrical tightness x16, with all reflecting high significance in interim models. Maintenance 
predictor x16 is related to re-torqueing lug bolts on the main electrical conductors as these 
connections can loosen over time. While no failures related to electrical tightness were reported, 
the only sites that reported performing electrical tightness checks were those with had full-time 
subject-matter experts on staff, and the periodicity of x16 appeared to correlate generally with the 
intensity of maintenance from those staff subject-matter experts. For this reason, and the high 





selected as the analogue predictor to represent the general quality of maintenance and testing in 
lieu of xb23, xb24, xsrc, or any other maintenance or test predictor. 
The interim regression models discussed in this section are included in Appendix B. 
 
HYPOTHESIS TESTS RESULTS 
Generator set reliability was found to be representable as a function of generator set age, 
run hours, and other maintenance and test predictors. The null hypothesis Ho0 was therefore 
rejected for the primary research question in favor of the alternate hypothesis Ha0 that 
maintenance periodicity, test periodicity, training, make, model, size, age, run time, or load have 
an impact on emergency diesel-electric generator set reliability.  
Predictors log(Tage) and log(Trtfv) were found to be highly significant. It can be stated with 
a high level of confidence that there is a relationship between generator set age and generator set 
reliability and that there is a relationship between generator set run hours and generator set 
reliability; the null hypotheses Ho4 and Ho5 were rejected. Predictors x12, x13, x16, x17, x18, xb23, 
xb24, xkW, xxl and xsrc each returned significant results in interim models, but there is a degree of 
conflation evident between these predictors. Due to this conflation, it cannot be stated with 
complete confidence from the results of the statistical analysis alone what the individual 
relationship of these predictors was with generator set reliability, but there was sufficient 
evidence to reject the null hypothesis for maintenance periodicity Ho1 and to include x16 in the 
final model as the collective analogue for maintenance. Sufficient evidence was found to reject 
the null hypothesis for test periodicity Ho2, but a test predictor specific to test periodicity could 





The regression results of interim models suggested the possibility of a relationship 
between generator size, load, make, and model, but such relationships may also be due to 
conflation. As no evidence was found to clearly demonstrate such relationships, the result of the 
null hypotheses test of Ho3, Ho6, Ho7, and Ho8 is failure to reject. 




Table 7.  Hypothesis Test Results Summary 
Null Hypothesis Result p-Test 
Ho0 Maintenance periodicity, test periodicity, training, make, 
model, size, age, run time and load have no impact on 
emergency diesel-electric generator set reliability. 
Reject p = 0.00002 
Ho1 Maintenance periodicity has no impact on emergency diesel-
electric emergency diesel-electric generator set reliability. 
Reject p = 0.047 
Ho2 Test periodicity has no impact on emergency diesel-electric 
generator set reliability. 
Reject See Text 
Ho3 Size has no impact on emergency diesel-electric emergency 
generator set reliability. 
Fail to reject p > 0.10 
Ho4 Age has no impact on emergency diesel-electric emergency 
generator set reliability. 
Reject p = 0.00002 
Ho5 Cumulative chronometer run-hours have no impact on 
emergency diesel-electric generator set reliability. 
Reject p = 0.0067 
Ho6 Load has no impact on emergency diesel-electric generator set 
reliability. 
Fail to reject p > 0.10 
Ho7 Training of servicing personnel has no impact on emergency 
diesel-electric generator set reliability. 
Fail to reject p > 0.10 
Ho8 Make and Model have no impact on emergency diesel-electric 
generator set reliability. 





HYPOTHESIS Ho1 TEST RESULTS 
The null hypothesis was rejected for maintenance periodicity Ho1. The maintenance 
predictor x16 was selected with coefficient β16 = 0.240 for the final model at a significance of 





and x18 and were found to be significant at α ≤ 0.10 in interim models, but there was a degree of 
conflation evident between these predictors and predictors xb23, xb24, kW, xl and xsrc that made 
determining the specific relationship of each predictor difficult. The significance of predictors 
kW, xL and xsrc are discussed in detail in subsequent paragraphs, but are believed to be significant 
in the interim regression models only due to a degree of conflation with significant maintenance 
predictors. None of the maintenance predictors were significant in combination with each other. 
Predictor x16 had the highest significance in the interim models and yielded the most significant 
mode and was thus selected to be a general analogue reflecting the conflated maintenance 
predictors x12, x13, x16, x17, and x18 and training predictors xb23 and xb24. Predictor x16 was viewed 
as generally reflecting the intensity and quality of maintenance efforts, and not specifically 
related to electrical tightness.   
 
HYPOTHESES Ho2 TEST RESULTS 
The null hypothesis was rejected for test periodicity Ho2 due to observations made during 
data acquisition. The most significant test periodicity predictor for dead-bus operational tests β22 
yielded p = 0.101 in one interim model, suggesting some significance but falling just beyond the 
criteria for statistical significance. Load test on operational load β21 yielded p = 0.106 in one 
interim model, suggesting some significance for this test periodicity as well, but also falling just 
beyond the criteria for significance. Load testing on a load bank β20 yielded p = 0.157 in one 
interim model and no-load testing β19 yielded p = 0.306 in another interim model. Conflation 
with other model predictors and subpopulation homogeneity is suspected to have contributed to 
the regression interim model results as the indications of negative test correlation of no-load tests 





The regression results may be a Type II error from insufficient data to determine a 
statistically significant relationship between test periodicity and reliability for the frequently 
tested and very frequently tested generator sets in the sample population, and the absence of 
available data from infrequently tested generator sets. Test failures were not requested or 
collected during data acquisition, but much larger numbers of test failures than operational 
failures were observed in historic records during data acquisition indicating that a positive 
correlation between test frequency and reliability would likely have been found had frequent 
tests not been conducted on these units, a correlation not visible in the regression results. A 
review of a portion of maintenance records acquired for this research covering a subpopulation 
of 225 standby-years of operation for units receiving weekly no-load tests and contractor 
maintenance visits every six months revealed fourteen test failures and three operational failures, 
a ratio of 4.7:1 of test to operational failures, and an annual reliability of 92% with test failures 
included. This is consistent with reliability levels reported by prior research that included test 
failures and operational failures in the reliability calculations. The small-scale data set of Fehr 
(2014) found eight test failures and two test failures in 126 standby-years of records, a ratio of 
4:1 of test to operational failures, and 94% reliability for well-maintained units with test failures 
included. PREP (TM 5-605-5) reported 88% annual reliability for a mix of well, average, and 







HYPOTHESES Ho3 TEST RESULTS 
The predictors for generator set size and data source were included in the model only to 
test the assumption that this model can be generalized to generator sets of different size and 
ensure that the source of the data was not a source of bias.  
Generator set size and data source were both found to be statistically significant in 
interim regression models with p = 0.094 and p = 0.039 respectively, but neither was significant 
when combined in a model with predictor x16.  These results are believed to be due to conflation 
with x16 and several other predictors due to stratification in the sample population. However, the 
results cannot be separated out and tested independently to verify these assumptions due to the 
conflation. 
Despite the inconclusive statistical results, inductive reasoning suggests that the 
relationship with generator size and source in the interim models was a Type 1 error from 
conflation with the subpopulation and not a direct cause. Therefore, this work fails to reject the 
null hypothesis that generator set size impacts reliability, but additional research is required to 
quantitatively support the assumption that this model is generalizable to different size generator 
sets. 
 
HYPOTHESES Ho4 TEST RESULTS 
Regression analysis suggests a statistically significant relationship between the log of 
emergency diesel-electric generator set age log(Tage) and reliability of βage = -1.476, with a 
significance of p = 0.000018, and thus the null hypothesis is rejected. This relationship exhibits a 
Weibull base hazard rate. The shape parameter mage of the Weibull base hazard rate can be 





mortality and higher reliability of older generator sets. This predictor was the most significant 
predictor in the model by two orders of magnitude and persisted with high significance in nearly 
every interim model suggesting a low level of conflation with other predictors and a high 
indication of independence. 
 
HYPOTHESES Ho5 TEST RESULTS 
Regression analysis suggests a statistically significant relationship between the log of 
emergency diesel-electric generator set cumulative run hours log(Trtfv) and reliability of 
βrtfv = 0.700, with a significance of p = 0.0067, and thus the null hypothesis is rejected. This 
relationship exhibits a Weibull base hazard rate. The shape parameter mrtfv of the Weibull 
distribution can be calculated as mrtfv = βrtfv + 1 = 1.700. The positive coefficient greater than one 
suggests a wear-out distribution. Although the coefficients for age and run hours were offsetting 
for much of the sample population, statistically significant relationships between reliability and 
age and reliability and run hours persisted in interim models even when only one or the other 
predictor was present, indicating the offset coefficients are a result of different effects and not 
conflation.   
 
HYPOTHESES Ho6 TEST RESULTS 
Generator set load presented a challenge to hypothesis testing, as xL was significant in 
interim models when included as the only time-independent predictor, but lost significance when 
paired with the other most significant predictors, x16, x12, and xsrc. The coefficients suggest 
conflation of generator set load xL with x12, x16, and xsrc. The conflation is explained by data 





regular tightness tests x16 and battery resistance or impedance tests x12 performed regular load 
tests at typical station load, but most sites in the sample population that did not regularly perform 
these maintenance steps performed no-load testing. Where load information was unavailable but 
generator sets were reported to receive weekly no-load tests, typical load xL was approximated as 
0 kW. Figure 14 shows a bubble chart with the data distribution comparing x16 and xL and 
reflects the negative correlation of x16 and xL.; the size of the bubbles in this chart reflect the 
histogram data. Figure 14 depicts 299 records, 251 of which are at x16 = 7 and xL = 0 kW.  All 
but two of the operational failures occurred in units receiving regular no-load testing at 0 kW 
load and no tightness testing, but xL values were biased by the assumption of 0 kW typical load. 
These units presumably supported load during utility power failures and should more accurately 
be reflected as operating at an average of something greater than 0 kW, but accurate load 
information was not reported for most of the units and thus is biased in the methodology. While 
xL is one of the most statistically significant results, the existence of bias and lower quality data 
suggests these results may be a Type 1 error. For this reason, xL was excluded from the final 







Figure 14. Generator set load and x16 bubble chart.  The size of the bubble reflects the number of 




HYPOTHESES Ho7 TEST RESULTS 
The null hypothesis for training Ho7 was rejected as the training predictors xb23 and xb24 
were both significant in interim models for staff subject-matter experts with a significance of 
p = 0.078, which meets the α ≤ 0.10 criteria for significance. There was no significance in the 
regression models distinguishing between staff collateral duty and service visit subject-matter 
expert (contractor) test and maintenance. These results were highly conflated with maintenance 
predictors x12, x13, x16, x17, and x18 and predictors kW, xl and xsrc, making individual analysis 
difficult. 
The training predictors xbi were intended by Fehr (2014) for inclusion in the model only 
as interaction terms to determine of the training level of technicians performing various test and 
maintenance actions had significance. No training modifier xbi was found to have any 





however, the aggregated training predictor for maintenance xb23 and the aggregated training 
predictor for tests xb24 were both unexpectedly found to have significance in interim models as 
standalone predictors.  
Predictors xb23 and xb24 were factors with three categories: staff subject-matter expert, 
staff collateral duty, and subject-matter expert service visit. The latter, subject-matter expert 
service visits, were all third-party contractors in the sample population. There was no statistically 
significant distinction found between staff collateral duty and service visit subject-matter expert, 
but there was a statistically significant difference between these two factors and staff subject-
matter expert. A new investigatory predictor xb25 was created as a factor with two categories: 
staff subject-matter expert, and not staff subject-matter expert. This predictor was found to have 
higher significance and higher model quality than either xb23 or xb24. Predictor xb25 was also found 
to be nearly fully conflated with electrical tightness test predictor x16, as only sites with staff 
subject-matter experts performed this maintenance action, and the periodicity at which sites 
performed this action appeared to correlate not simply with this action, but the intensity of 
maintenance and testing periodicity in general. This hidden correlation with maintenance rigor 
may explain why predictor x16 was found to have such a high significance despite no reported 
failures in the sample population related to electrical tightness. As the presence of maintenance 
personnel is meaningless without action, maintenance predictor x16 must still represent 
maintenance actions, but it also appears to be a better analogue for training than any of the 






HYPOTHESES Ho8 TEST RESULTS 
The analysis of the sample population suggests no statistically significant relationship 
between emergency diesel-electric generator set make (MAKE) or model (MODEL) factors, with 
p > 0.10 in all interim regression models, resulting in a failure to reject the null hypothesis. The 
complexity of the emergency diesel-electric generator set market made this criterion difficult to 
evaluate as different manufacturers outsource engines and generators from different companies 
utilizing different engine manufacturers for different model units. Different makes often source 
the same engine or generator, and mergers and acquisitions and licensing agreements have 
blended different makes under different marques.  While many technicians offered unsolicited 
opinions on various marques during this research, no statistically significant difference was 
found between any make or model.  However, this lack of statistically significant difference 
between makes or models may represent Type II error and does not prove there is no difference 
in reliability between different makes or models, only that this work failed to reject the null 
hypothesis. When all makes and models were condensed into nine marques, Caterpillar, 
Cummins, Onan, MTU, Empire, Generac, SDMO, Olympian, and Kohler, little significance was 
found.   
The regression, included in Appendix B, compared each marque to Caterpillar, but only 
two marques were found to have statistically significant differences, Olympian and Onan, with 
p = 0.075 and p = 0.085 respectively, both with positive coefficients indicating reduced 
reliability compared to Caterpillar. Olympian is a Caterpillar brand of 30kW-200kW generator 
sets manufactured at different times by Caterpillar and under license by Generac (Generac 
Corporation v. Caterpillar, 1999), so there may be some conflation here due to either generator 





Onan products are produced by Cummins Power Generation (Cummins, 2017). Cummins 
manufactures small diesel-electric generator sets under the Onan name, as well as large 
generators coupled to Cummins-branded engines. Several larger generator sets in the sample 
population were recorded as Onan, but may be referring to Onan generators coupled to Cummins 
engines, so it remains difficult to determine if Onan performance differs significantly from the 
others.   
Combining Olympian with Caterpillar and Onan with Cummins and re-running the 
regression resulted in MTU becoming statistically significant with a negative coefficient and 
p = 0.036, a marked change from the significance of p = 0.427 in the regression when Olympian 
and Onan were considered separate marques. Like Caterpillar and Cummins, MTU owns 
multiple makes including Detroit Diesel and Katolight, which were included under the MTU 
marque for this analysis. The large change between the two regressions casts doubt on whether 
MTU is more reliable than the other marques or the second result is Type I error. 
Given the differences between the two regressions and potential for Type I error through 
random chance, the significant regression results for Olympian, Onan, and MTU are insufficient 
evidence to reject the null hypothesis or to void the assumption that this research is generalizable 
across many different makes and models of modern low-emissions emergency diesel-electric 
generator sets.   
If this finding is a Type II error and there is a difference between the reliability of 
different makes, it’s likely modest, as large differences in reliability should have been detected 
by this methodology. There is also potential for bias between makes related to market share of 
different makes in different size ranges and applications, and the potential for increased 





smaller units. Additional research is required to validate the assumption of generalizability and 
determine if there is a relationship between generator make and reliability. 
 
DISCUSSION 
By regression analysis, the reliability of emergency diesel-electric generator sets was 
found to be representable by a parametric proportional hazards model with exponential and 
Weibull base hazard rates. This model includes an exponential base hazard rate λ, an infant-
mortality Weibull base hazard rate based on generator set age log(Tage), a wear-out Weibull base 
hazard rate based on generator set cumulative chronometer run hours log(Trtfv), and a covariate 
predictor x16 that regression and analysis suggests to be an analogue represents the general 
intensity of maintenance and testing. 
Five of the twenty-two test and maintenance predictors were found to have significance 
in various interim regression models included in Appendix B, but these test and maintenance 
predictors were found to be highly conflated with each other and with generator set size and 
load. These seven predictors attained offsetting coefficients and lost significance when applied in 
any combination in models, indicating a level of conflation. Much of this conflation was found to 
be due to common stratifications and subpopulation homogeneity in the sample population. 
Further investigation into the sample population revealed the highest significance maintenance 
and test predictor, electrical tightness testing x16, appear to be related to the general intensity and 
rigor of maintenance. The most reliable generator sets in the sample population were those 
maintained by staffs of full-time generator technicians that performed intensive maintenance like 
x16 at very frequent intervals. Predictor x16 appears to have become significant in the model 





population and thus was more sensitive to very small differences in generator set reliability 
between the subpopulations. The regression results and analysis suggest that predictor x16 is 
highly representative of the general intensity of maintenance within the sample population.   
The regression analysis of emergency diesel-electric generator set data revealed 
statistically significant relationships with age and run hours suggesting generators become more 
reliable with age, but less reliable at higher run hours. The relationship between reliability and 
generator set age has the strongest significance relationship in the model with p = 0.000018. The 
shape parameter mage of the Weibull base hazard rate can be calculated as 
mage = βage + 1 = -0.476. The negative coefficient suggests a relationship of infant mortality and 
higher reliability of older generator sets. That generators become more reliable with age is at first 
counter-intuitive, but this funding seems to reflect the statistical impact of infant mortality and 
shows that well-maintained generator sets do not exhibit wear-out characteristics based on age 
alone. This research suggests the operational life of older generator sets with good maintenance 
and repair support may be extended with little risk. However, reliability is not the only parameter 
that matters, and operational availability of units is a function of mean time to repair. Retirement 
of units of any age may be prudent when spare parts and maintenance support are no longer 
available or units incur excessive time to repair.   
The model also reflects generator sets with greater run-hours as being less reliable, which 
follows logic, as machinery of this sort exhibits wear characteristics and nearly identical 
generator sets in prime-power generation applications are well known to wear out from use. The 
mean annual run-time of generator sets in this study was 31.2 hours per year, which results in an 
interesting parity; the infant mortality of log(Tage) was found to dominate the model the first five 





of cumulative run hours to reliability was found to be highly statistically significant with 
p = 0.0067.   
The shape parameter mrtfv of the log(Trtfv) Weibull base hazard rate can be calculated as 
mrtfv = βrtfv + 1 = 1.700. The positive coefficient suggests a wear-out relationship which 
generators of greater run-hours exhibiting reduced reliability. The mode of this pattern is 
important for failure prediction and determination in the statistically optimal retirement date for 
units with high hours, but the mode unfortunately cannot be determined directly from the 
regression results, as the λ value from the regression represents the sum of the contributions from 
the base exponential distribution, the log(Tage) Weibull parameters and log(Ttrfv) Weibull 
parameters. Without the ability to extract the specific λ contribution of each piece, the predictive 
power of this portion of the model is limited. One manufacturer representative who did not wish 
to be cited said his company expects their longest-lived model of emergency generator set to be 
completely overhauled every 11,000 hours and replaced after 22,000 hours of use. The typical 
generator set in this study would take 32 years to accumulate 1000 hours and even the most used 
generator set in this study only accumulated 4680 hours. Only generator sets in areas with 
exceptionally poor-quality utility power or operated in duty cycles other than emergency duty 
could experience this many hours before replacement. It would take 110 years for an emergency 
generator set to reach 22,000 hours at the ISO 8528-1 (2005) maximum rated 200 hours per year. 
No statistically significant relationships were found in the data for make, model, size, or 
load, but insufficient power was realized to conclude the absence of these relationships due to the 
limited amount of data. Likewise, confirmation could not be confidently made that there were no 
interactions between these predictors and other maintenance and test predictors. Some of the 





dependencies would be expected to be clear despite the limited data. Further, the absence of such 
results in the model and the large numbers of predictors involved suggest the significant results 
in some interim models were more likely from Type I error than actual relationships. Some terms 
were included in the regression to avoid reliance upon testable a priori assumptions, but 
similarities in technology and construction of generator sets in this size range permits the a priori 
assumption to be made that the reaction to maintenance will be similar for all makes and models 
of generator sets of the size range in this study. This assumption permits treating the sample 
population as a single population and permits drawing additional conclusions from the data 
without the need for make, model, or size covariates. 
When the parametric model results were compared to the sample MTBF from the data, 
the model results appeared to slightly over-estimate the effect on reliability of maintenance, with 
the model over-predicting the reliability of units receiving high intensity maintenance by 0.6% 
but under-predicting the reliability of units receiving lower intensity maintenance by 0.6%. The 
difference between the sample MTBF and model suggests there may be influence from other 
sources not included in this model. This was unsurprising considering the amount of conflation 
between x16 and other predictors within the sample population and the imprecision of x16 in 
representing all test and maintenance for these generator sets. The significance of this predictor 
in the statistical models and effect size strongly suggests a relationship between emergency 
diesel-electric generator set reliability and the maintenance and test intensity. While there may be 
some error and uncertainty in the model results, there was enough evidence conclude that 
maintenance and testing have an impact on generator set reliability. This knowledge can be used 
to aid managers in determining the appropriate intensity of maintenance and testing for their 





This research initially sought to develop a general model to quantitatively determine the 
optimal level of test and maintenance periodicity for emergency diesel-electric generator sets. 
More generally speaking, however, the model was a means to an end, and the true intention was 
to develop recommendations for managers to improve the performance of emergency power 
systems supporting critical operations facilities and other facilities requiring highly reliable 
emergency power. The optimal periodicity of NFPA 110 (2016) maintenance and test predictors 
cannot be precisely determined from this data, but the significant relationship in this data 
strongly suggests that more intensive maintenance and testing yields higher reliability than less 
intensive maintenance and testing. The sample subpopulation with full-time subject-matter 
experts on staff and the highest intensity maintenance had the highest operational reliability and 
an observed failure rate of 1.647% per year. The sample population receiving outsourced 
maintenance also had high operational reliability, much higher than previous studies (Hale & 
Arno, 2009; IEEE 493-2007), but the observed failure rate for the lower intensity subpopulation 
was about 2.85 times higher than the higher intensity subpopulation, at 4.695% per year. The 
new knowledge from this work will help managers make staffing and maintenance and testing 
decisions. There is a roughly order of magnitude cost difference going from outsourced 
maintenance to a full-time staff, so the decision is not necessarily an easy one.   
One concern mentioned multiple times by technicians during data acquisition and by 
sources such as Loehlein (2007) is that frequent no-load tests damage engines and cause wet-
stacking, a condition where cylinder and exhaust temperatures are insufficient to achieve 
complete diesel combustion, resulting in deposits in the cylinder and a build-up of unburnt diesel 
fuel in the exhaust system. The only record was reviewed during data acquisition with a failure 





testing, only weekly no-load testing, and may have had another attributable cause such as very 
low load during emergency operation. This was one of the smallest generator sets in the sample 
population and no other generator sets in this study were reported to have any failures or serious 
problems related to wet stacking or low-load operation, although a few units not regularly tested 
under load were found during maintenance to show signs that wet stacking was occurring. NFPA 
110 (2016) recommends, and in some cases requires, monthly load tests with ATS transfer and 
annual load-bank tests for units that operate below 30% load and do not achieve adequate 
exhaust temperature during these tests. Tufte (2014) recommended limiting loads below 30% to 
no more than 8 hours before loading the generator set at minimum 50% load. Tufte (2014) found 
that while older generator sets and early low-emissions units were highly susceptible to wet-
stacking, the newest generation of generator sets can run at much lower levels for longer periods 
before running into wet stacking or similar low-load problems and can run up to 8 hours at below 
10% load and 24 hours below 30% load before running above 50% load is necessary. None of 
the units in the sample population receiving monthly operational load tests were reported to have 
any issues related to wet stacking.   
NFPA 110 (2016) does not require regular no-load tests, and Cummins recommends no-
load tests be held to a minimum (Loehlein, 2007). However, technicians at the Cummins factory 
could not recall any of their newest engines suffering from wet-stacking when asked, and no-
load tests are required by Caterpillar to perform certain preventative maintenance checks 
(Caterpillar, 1997; Caterpillar, 2010a; Caterpillar, 2010b; Caterpillar, 2010c; Caterpillar, 2010d).  
There are some negative effects on diesel engines from running at low load, but these negative 
effects are largely neutralized by running periodically at higher loads (Tufte, 2014). 





likely would have resulted in operational failures had those no-load tests not been conducted. 
Thirty-minute weekly no-load tests will accumulate twenty hours per year in addition to the 
monthly load tests required by NFPA 110 for certain applications. Similar increases in run hours 
were found by the regression to result in a statistical increase in failure rate. However, the 
relationship found between run-hours and reliability is logarithmic and the hazard rate increases 
only slightly with an additional twenty hours of run time per year. This is a very small impact 
compared to the contribution of maintenance and test intensity on overall generator set 
reliability. This analysis suggests the benefits of no-load testing are greater than the incurred 
wear or negative effects, and a test plan with regular weekly no-load tests and monthly load tests 
with ATS transfer will result in an overall increase in generator set reliability. 
Another important consideration is that tests are intended to detect hidden failures so they 
can be quickly corrected, but tests must be monitored to be useful. Numerous incidents were 
recorded in logs of automatic no-load tests failing but going unnoticed for weeks or months 
because nobody noticed or reported the test failure. In one instance, a generator set in a remote 
portion of a university campus suffered a controller failure and ran for 23 days at idle until it ran 
dry of oil and catastrophically seized, requiring replacement. If the scheduled weekly testing of 
this unit had been monitored, it would likely still be in service. In other instances, alarms 
reported to technicians could not be replicated or troubleshot, and the result was that multiple 
failures occurred before the prudent corrective maintenance action could be completed. If 
technicians had been on-site during the first test that exhibited problems, corrective maintenance 
actions may have been more quickly taken and problems corrected. Other issues such as the 
potential for oil and coolant leaks increase the risk of unmonitored testing causing environmental 





mild overheating, squealing belts, bearing noise, or other indications of pending failures that 
would not necessarily result in an alarm. The benefit of no-load tests is reduced and risk is 
increased if exercisers automatically run no-load tests without active monitoring. All tests should 
be actively monitored to achieve maximum benefit.  
This study did not directly investigate operational availability, but it was recognized that 
no-load test failure alarms going un-noticed for months would yield much lower availability than 
no-load test failures that received prompt response. The data acquired for this study primarily 
consisted of logs recorded by subject-matter experts and did not include information on local 
monitoring of no-load tests, making it difficult to determine how quickly automatic no-load test 
failures were detected and responded to with appropriate corrective action. Some of the higher 
failure rates of the units receiving automatic no-load tests and less frequent visits by servicing 
personnel may have been biased by lack of monitoring. Sites were recorded as performing no-
load tests if the exerciser was configured, but if nobody was monitoring those tests, much of the 
benefits of these tests were lost. As these sites were included in the regression as if they were 
performing regular no-load tests, the bias would result in a model that underestimates the 
reliability of generator sets receiving regular monitored no-load tests. 
 
GENERALIZABILITY 
The purpose of this research was to develop a general model for determining the 
reliability and optimal test and maintenance periodicities for emergency diesel-electric generator 
sets supporting critical operations facilities and other facilities requiring highly reliable 
emergency power, but with the intent of creating a general model applicable to all emergency 





described in the system subcomponents section of the introduction. As data was readily available 
for a number of units in the 10 kW to 60 kW size range and the decision to delimit to 60 kW was 
arbitrary, the regression analysis was expanded to cover units 10 kW to 2.5 MW. No statistically 
significant evidence was found during the regression analysis of the sample population to 
indicate a lack of generalizability of this model across this size range. 
The pre-hoc power analysis predicted that a sample size of 1142 standby-years including 
141 operational failures would achieve adequate power at α = 0.1 and β = 0.2. The sample 
population included 1281 standby-years of generator set data from 239 generator sets, capturing 
58 operational failures in 40,161 run-hours of operation. As the sample population proved to be 
more reliable than anticipated during pre-hoc power analysis, insufficient operational failures 
were observed to achieve adequate power at α = 0.1 and β = 0.2. No statistically significant 
relationship was found between reliability and generator set make, model, or size. However, due 
to data failing to achieve the predicted power for this study, the absence of evidence of a 
relationship between reliability and generator set make, model, or size is insufficient statistical 
evidence to conclude the absence of such relationships without an unacceptable risk of Type 2 
error. 
Other methods were attempted to test generalizability of the model within the sample 
population including sensitivity analysis. Sensitivity analysis removing all the small units from 
the sample population revealed little change to regression results. The sensitivity analysis tested 
various intentionally biased models where portions of the population were removed, new failures 
were introduced, and failures were removed. None of the sensitivity analysis tests resulted in 
large changes to any significant model parameter, which suggested relationships in the final 





Present maintenance guidance (NFPA 110, 2016) does not make distinctions based on 
make, model, or size and there are reasonable arguments for this assumption supported by many 
technicians (Walbolt, 2010). Fehr (2014) made a general a priori assumption that generator sets 
of make, model, and size within the delimitations of this research represent a common population 
with a common response to maintenance. Given this rationale and the lack of evidence to the 
contrary, it is appropriate to continue the a priori assumption of generalizability of make, model, 
and size from the Fehr (2014) framework and extend the generalizability of this model to all 
emergency diesel generator sets between 10 kW and 2.5 MW electrical capacity with of the 
characteristics described in Chapter I. This can also be extended to apply to spark ignition natural 
gas-powered generator sets based on modified diesel engines as these engines are identical in 
nearly every way to diesel engines, and no evidence was found in this study that natural gas and 
diesel engines responded differently to NFPA 110 maintenance.   
 
LIMITATIONS 
The Cox (1972)-based regression failed to calculate the specific contribution of each of 
the twenty-two maintenance and test predictors. Although 1281 standby-years of generator set 
data from 239 generator sets was acquired for this data, only 58 operational failures were 
captured, fewer than the 141 failures anticipated to yield statistically significant results at 
α = 0.10 and β = 0.20 by Hsieh and Lavori (2007) methods. This was likely exacerbated by a 
lack of diversity in the sample population which consisted largely of Department of Defense and 
contractor-maintained commercial units being maintained in accordance with Department of 
Defense policies and standard commercial practices. The sample population included very few 





units that received no regular tests or poor maintenance, data essential to teasing significant 
results from generator sets that have been found to be far more reliable in practice than previous 
research suggested. The lack of available data on poorly-maintained units further reduced the 
realized normalized covariate variance σ2 used in the Hsieh and Lavori (2007) power 
calculations to estimate the amount of data required for this research. 
The Fehr (2014) framework relied upon several common characteristics of emergency 
diesel-electric generator sets to work including a large data pool, diversity of maintenance 
practices, and good records. While there was some diversity of maintenance practices, the 
sample population included a large degree of stratification and conflation, making it difficult to 
discern statistically significant results with the available data. To better differentiate the impact 
of test and maintenance periodicity, more data must also be drawn from units of average and 
poor-quality maintenance.   
Insufficient data prevented the support of generalizability of this model by statistical 
power analysis. Make, model, and size were not found to have statistical significance, but the 
risk of Type II error exceeds the threshold of β = 0.20 due to the higher than expected reliability 
of the sample population and relative homogeneity of maintenance. While the reliability model 
developed herein is believed to be generalizable to all models of diesel-electric generator sets 
within the size range of 10 kW to 2.5 MW in emergency service, this belief requires an a priori 
assumption. 
Another limitation of this research is that it was restricted to NFPA 110 (2016) 
recommended maintenance with periodicity of one year or less. Maintenance such as engine 
overhauls, battery replacement, thermostat replacement, and block heater replacement were not 





acquisition. The choice to focus on maintenance with recommended periodicity of one year or 
less was made to reduce the scope of this study to a reasonable length observation period and is 
consistent with NFPA 110 (2016) recommended practice, but as such, this study is unable to 
measure the effectiveness of maintenance actions with longer periodicity. Future research should 
be extended to include such additional maintenance items. 
 
AVAILABILITY CALCULATIONS 
A secondary objective of this framework was to use the data to calculate the availability 
of generator sets with varying level of maintenance for inclusion into the US Army Corps of 
Engineers Power Reliability Enhancement Program (PREP) database and future editions of TM 
5-698-5 (2006), NFPA70B (2016), and IEEE 493 (2007). This would allow engineers to better 
design emergency generator systems to meet availability requirements and allow managers to 
make well informed risk decisions when planning maintenance. This research has produced the 
reliability model in Equation 14, but was unable to produce calculations of inherit availability Ai 
or operational availability Ao, as repair time data was not collected, nor was data collected on 
unavailability periods due to scheduled preventative maintenance or corrective maintenance 
following test failures. While the operational reliability statistics determined by this research can 
be used to estimate operational reliability based on generator set age, run hours, and maintenance 
for the purposes of engineering calculations, similar estimations of availability will require 
additional research.   
Previous research estimated inherent availability for emergency diesel-electric generator 
sets as Ai = 0.999712 for well-maintained generator sets (Fehr, 2014) and Ai = 0.9974 for a 





698-5, 2006). This order of magnitude disparity between prior research findings on availability 
and these new research findings on reliability suggest the availability of well-maintained units 
and poorly-maintained units may differ by a large degree and use of PREP availability numbers 
is likely highly conservative for well-maintained generator sets. 
Mean time to repair (MTTR) will differ between sites as well. Previous research 
estimated MTTR as 18.3 hours (TM 6-698-5, 2006). This MTTR was pooled from an average of 
well, average, and poorly-maintained generator sets. PREP did not publish information on 
staffing at these facilities, but it can be inferred that a site with full time subject-matter experts on 
staff and well-stocked inventories of spare parts on-site will have a shorter mean time to repair 
than sites that experience contracting, travel, and shipping delays. Sites that fail to monitor no-
load generator tests might have effective MTTR measured in weeks as failures may not be 
noticed until the next scheduled maintenance. 
Another complication is the difficulty in determining the time between the occurrence of 
hidden failures and subsequent repair as only the time of discovery of the failure is typically 
known, not the point where the failure occurred. For example, it may not be known when a 
starter battery died, for instance, only that the unit did not start the next time it was attempted. 
 
OTHER APPLICATIONS 
The survival regression technique discussed herein using a Cox (1972) proportional 
hazards model to simultaneously combine multiple exponential and Weibull relationships as 
predictors is believed to have a wide number of applications for describing complex machinery 
and other populations exhibiting survival distributions based upon multiple independent base 





coxph statistical modeling packages in the R libraries eha and survival (Broström, 2011) or other 
statistical packages that use Cox regression algorithms. This survival regression technique could 
be directly applied to empirical research into transformer statistical lifetime modeling similar to 
the simulated modeling of Zhou, Wang, and Li (2014), or to any number of complex machinery 
where the lack of such methods to account for time dependent properties necessitated 
assumptions of exponential relationships (Moubray, 1997; Hale & Arno, 2009). This type of 
model could potentially also be used to better represent populations presently represented by 
pure Weibull failure modes but that are also subject to unrelated random failures like lightning 
strikes and accidents. 
The Fehr (2014) framework for this research has other potential uses as well. While this 
framework was developed to provide a means of determining optimal maintenance of emergency 
diesel-electric generator systems, the Fehr (2014) methodology would apply equally well to 
create general models for other high-reliability systems that, due to a combination of low failure 
rates and the censorship actions of preventative maintenance, are difficult to analyze with 
conventional failure modes and effects analysis techniques. This framework could be adapted to 
analyze system subcomponents as well as whole systems. Potential applications of these 
techniques include uninterruptible power supply systems; heating, ventilation, and air 
conditioning systems; maritime shipping industry systems; military applications; aviation 
industry systems, and others.   
This framework is most effective where the data pool is large compared to the failure 
rate, where maintenance practices vary, where training of maintenance crews vary, where good 
records are maintained in a consistent fashion, and where the units have been in service long 





rates of similar models of military aircraft in service at different organizations that receive 
different maintenance practices or utilize different training. This includes widely produced and 
internationally sold aircraft such as the General Dynamics F-16 Fighting Falcon, the Sukhoi Su-
27, Sikorsky UH-60 Black Hawk, and unmanned aerial systems (UAS) such as the General 






VI.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
Diesel-electric generator sets in emergency standby duty receiving average or better 
levels of maintenance were found to have significantly higher operational reliability than 
previous research (Fehr, 2014; TM 5-698-5, 2006) indicated. The Fehr (2014) framework was 
successfully applied to perform Cox (1972) regression and piecewise constant hazard model 
analysis on 1281 standby-years of generator set data from 239 generator sets with 58 operational 
failures in 40,161 run-hours to develop a parametric Cox proportional hazards model with 
exponential and Weibull base hazard rates representing generator set reliability as a function of 
age, run hours, and maintenance intensity. This model can be used to estimate the reliability of 
generator sets of various age, run hours, and maintenance intensity. 
This research found that generator sets exhibited characteristics of multiple survival 
distributions including exponential random failure, Weibull wear-out, and Weibull infant 
mortality. The regression model found generator sets in this study suffered elevated failure rates 
in the first few years after installation but become more reliable as they aged. This result was 
unexpected, but was a highly statistically significant finding with p = 0.000018. The model also 
found generator sets became less reliable as cumulative run hours increased, offsetting much of 
the age-related increase in reliability for units near the near 31.2 hours annual run hours in the 
sample population. Statistical significance for run hours was also very high at p = 0.0067. These 
highly significant results provide confidence that the Weibull log(Tage) and log(Trtfv) relationships 
are representative of the population and not a result of Type I error. The regression failed to 
return information that will allow precise estimates of the optimal periodicity of all NFPA 110 





maintenance has a very strong effect on generator set reliability with a significance of p = 0.047. 
This research found that common commercial maintenance plans with weekly no-load generator 
tests and monthly, bi-monthly, or quarterly maintenance achieve mean annual reliability levels 
higher than 96% for well-established units with typical run hours. This modeling further shows 
that sites with full-time staffs of subject-matter experts and highly intense maintenance plans can 
reduce the rate of operational failures by another 66-80%, achieving greater than 99% annual 
operational availability for similar generator sets. 
The maintenance predictor for check electrical tightness x16 was found to function as an 
analogue for the general intensity of maintenance and testing for the final model, and it was the 
most significant maintenance or test predictor at p = 0.0067. Several other maintenance 
predictors showed some statistical significance in some interim models, but the individual 
contribution of each of these predictors could not be determined due to conflation and 
stratification in the data, and statistical significance was lost when these predictors were included 
together in any combination in other interim models. The predictor x16 was found to be heavily 
conflated with predictors for the personnel conducting the most frequent touch maintenance xb23 
(staff subject-matter expert vs. subject-matter expert site visit), data source xsrc, and maintenance 
periodicities for battery resistance or impedance test x12, clean unit exterior x13, engine intensive 
maintenance x17 and generator electrical intensive maintenance x18. Interpretation of this finding, 
guided by the statistical significance of each predictor and other associated knowledge, is that x16 
represented not just checks for electrical tightness, but the general intensity of all maintenance. 
Sites in the sample population with large subject-matter expert staffs performing the shortest 
periodicity tests had the shortest periodicity of x16 while sites with contract maintenance did not 





and maintenance predictors, but the relationship can be estimated by a categorization as average, 
high, and extremely high maintenance intensity represented respectively by x16=7 years, x16=1 
year, and x16=
1/12 year. In this context, average maintenance refers to generator sets receiving 
weekly automatic no-load tests and contractor site visits with a periodicity of one to six months. 
Highly intensive maintenance refers to sites adhering to NFPA 110 (2016) requirements and 
generator sets receiving weekly maintenance and monthly load tests with ATS transfer. 
Extremely high intensity maintenance refers to sites well exceeding NFPA 110 requirements 
with daily maintenance, weekly load tests, and intensive monthly maintenance. The only sites in 
this study receiving extremely high intensity maintenance were critical operations power system 
facilities with large full-time on-site staffs of generator technicians, electricians, and mechanics 
tasked exclusively with maintenance and operation of a small number of emergency diesel-
electric generator sets and uninterruptible power supply systems. 
No statistically significant evidence was found that contradicts the a priori assumption 
that generator set make, model, or size within the range in this study have no significant impact 
to reliability or the related assumption that this research can be generalized to all diesel-electric 
generator sets 10 kW to 2.5 MW in emergency duty operating fewer than 200 hours per year. It 
was sought to confirm this assumption quantitatively to increase confidence, but there was 
insufficient data to do so. 
 A regression technique combining exponential and Weibull distribution components was 
successfully used with standard Cox (1972) regression functions coxreg and coxph in the 
Survival package for R. This technique included time dependent covariate predictors for age and 
cumulative run hours in the regression analysis in the form log(T), which is mathematically 





regression of multiple exponential and Weibull relationships simultaneously. A weakness was 
found in the unavailability of parametric regression tools to complete the analysis; the phreg 
function in the Survival package in R accurately estimated regression coefficients but was unable 
to properly fit the model due to the inability of the function to treat time dependent variables as 
both static and time dependent in different portions of the algorithm. Utilizing piecewise constant 
hazard (PCH) modeling in Microsoft Excel to fit the model to empirical subpopulation reliability 
calculations permitted development of a parametric model, but this modelling could be improved 
with adaptation of R functions that can better handle time dependent variables. As logarithmic 
functions become asymptotic as the limit approaches zero, the PCH model was calculated with 
one-year cuts starting at year one. 
The shape parameter of constituent Weibull distribution components within the combined 
model can be directly calculated from the β coefficients returned by the regression, but the scale 
parameter returned by the regression cannot be easily separated from the scalar h0 which contains 
the product of the baseline exponential distribution λ and all other Weibull scale parameters in 
the model. Overall model performance is unimpacted, as h0 still contains all these coefficients, 
but not knowing what the scale parameter values are prevents direct calculation of the Weibull 
distribution modes or other predictions that would be useful for better understanding system 




The reliability of diesel-electric generator sets in emergency standby applications should 
be calculated by engineers and managers using Equation 19 as a function of generator set age, 





and 0.0833 for very high. Reliability tables are provided in Appendix C for average, high, and 
extremely high intensity maintenance of generator sets at different ages and run hours. The 
reliability tables in Appendix C reflects the findings of this research that generator reliability is 
not static over time, and that new generator sets are statistically less reliable than generator sets 













 The model developed by this research predicts generator sets will become more reliable 
as they age, but this does not necessarily mean generator sets should remain in service 
indefinitely, as reduced availability of spare parts and qualified maintenance personnel for older 
units may increase time to repair and decrease operational availability to unacceptable levels and 
necessitate generator set replacement based on obsolescence. Managers should consider 
extending the life of generator sets with low cumulative run hours and plan replacement based on 
criteria other than just age. Other options such as refurbishment or replacement of obsolete 
ancillary components may be the most optimal solution for some aging generator sets. Changing 
emissions requirements or other local requirements may also play a role. 
 One of the questions originally driving this research was whether no-load tests are 
beneficial or harmful to generator set reliability from the additional wear from testing and risk of 
wet stacking. Test failure data was not specifically investigated in this research, but a review of a 
subpopulation receiving weekly no-load tests revealed 82% of total failures were found during 





had those tests not occurred. The only evidence of wet-stacking reported in the generator sets of 
this sample population were in a small number of units that did not receive any regular load tests 
or transfer tests. Only one unit was reported to have suffered a failure related to wet stacking, but 
this unit may have had another attributable cause. No generator sets also conducting monthly 
transfer load tests were reported to have any evidence or symptoms of wet stacking. Other 
research has found the effects of wet stacking are minimal in the latest generation of generator 
sets and mitigated on all diesel engines by regularly running under load (Tufte, 2014). 
Conducting weekly no-load tests in addition to monthly transfer load tests will incur an addition 
twenty run-hours of no-load tests per year, a rate that has only a small negative impact to long-
term generator reliability due to the logarithmic relationship between cumulative chronometer 
run hours and generator reliability.   
All managers interested in improving emergency generator set reliability should conduct 
weekly monitored no-transfer tests and monthly load tests with automatic transfer switch 
transfer. The no-transfer tests may be no-load tests or load bank tests for sites configured with 
load banks. These tests should not be conducted by automatic exerciser, but should be manually 
initiated and monitored by qualified personnel to reduce the time to repair and increase the 
likelihood that problems will be discovered, and corrective actions taken. Even monitoring of 
tests by minimally trained site personnel has advantages over unmonitored automatic tests. Such 
tests also give personnel an opportunity to gain and maintain proficiency in generator set 
operation. NFPA 110 (2016) should be updated to require weekly no-transfer tests for legally 
required units and should clarify that mandatory tests must be monitored. All generator sets 
receiving regular no-load tests should also receive monthly load tests, even if not required to by 





of rated load for the newest units and above 30% of rated load for older units, as it is important 
to ensure damage from low-load operation does not occur. Periods of up to eight hours at low 
loads should be followed by loading the units to at least 50% (Tufte, 2014). Legally required 
generator sets must be loaded to a minimum 30% per NFPA110 (2016) during the required 
monthly load test with ATS transfer. 
 Generator sets utilizing contract subject-matter expert site visits yielded very high 
reliability, but the highest reliability levels were at facilities with staff subject-matter experts 
conducting generator set maintenance and tests at much more frequent intervals than required by 
NFPA 110 (2016). Generator sets receiving such extremely high intensity maintenance were 
found to have 66-80% fewer operational failures than sites receiving average levels of 
maintenance. While full time staffs may not be financially viable or justifiable for all facilities, 
full time staffs or highly intensive contracts should be considered for sites where failure has 
catastrophic consequences. 
The United States Army Corp of Engineers’ Power Reliability Enhancement Program 
(PREP) should update TM 5-698-5 (2006), NFPA should updated NFPA 70B (2016), and IEEE 
should update IEEE 493-2007 (2007) to reflect the impact of maintenance intensity, age, and run 
hours on generator set operational reliability. Additional research is needed to better determine 
emergency generator set availability based on maintenance, testing, age, and run hours. 
Additional investigation should also be made into the applicability of the Fehr (2014) 
methodology for the reliability of uninterruptible power supply systems; heating, ventilation, and 
air conditioning systems; maritime shipping industry systems; military applications; aviation 
industry systems; and other complex systems which share similar traits of maintenance-censored 





 Survival models using a Cox proportional hazards model with exponential and Weibull 
base hazard rates were developed with relative ease by software implementing Cox regression 
techniques and described emergency diesel-electric generator sets better than more traditional 
models assuming a single survival distribution. This survival distribution technique including 
Weibull components as logarithmic covariate predictors should be considered for other systems 
whose overall survival distribution may be best represented as a combination of multiple 
independent distributions. Better software tools should be developed to enable better 
development of non-parametric regression models with time dependent covariates. 
 Lastly, the research herein should be continued until sufficient data is acquired to 
quantitatively determine specific optimal test and maintenance periodicities. This research 
should be expanded to contain test failures and times to repair so that availability can be 
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REPORTING PERIOD Please submit a separate form for each period*.
* This information is for contact purposes only
Run hours at start of reporting period
Run hours at end of reporting period
Start date of reporting period
End date of reporting period
Generator Test and Maintenance Study
Fleet Cyber Command/Commander Tenth Fleet i s  conducting a  s tudy on the impact of test and maintenance interva ls  on the rel iabi l i ty of 
modern high-efficiency diesel -electric generator sets .  As  manufacturers ’ preventative maintenance recommendations  di ffer s igni ficantly, 
and often contradictory depending on which manufacturer representative or document you reference, actual  implementation has  varied 
widely.  This  presents  us  an opportunity to review your logs  and scienti fica l ly determine the benefi t of more frequent tests  and preventative 
maintenance.  This  s tudy wi l l  shape future FCC/C10F pol icy for test and maintenance frequency.
Please complete this  survey and emai l  i t to Steve Fehr, FCC/C10F power engineer, at s tephen.fehr@navy.mi l .  FCC/C10F commands  should 
cons ider this  a  data  ca l l ; other organizations  (publ ic or private) are encouraged to participate, as  the more data  we have, the better this  
s tudy wi l l  be.  Results  of the s tudy wi l l  be provided to a l l  who participate.  Sens i tive information wi l l  not be shared.
POINT OF CONTACT INFORMATION
UNIT INFORMATION Please submit a separate form for each genset.
Genset Make
Generator Name ("#1" etc)
* This information will not be shared outside of US Navy.   ** This study is 
looking primarily at "modern" emergency diesel generator sets 
manufactured after 1990.
Typical operational loads (%)
* Please report as many years of service as you have records for.  Each 
reporting period should cover a single genset over a period of consistent 
maintenance and testing. If maintenance or test procedures or frequency 
changed, please submit a separate form.  For instance, if a genset installed 
in 1998 changed from weekly to monthly testing in 2004, 1998-2004 is one 
























































































































































Battery voltage & physical condition
OTHER COMMENTS Any information that might help us properly interpret your data, such as information about unit damage, special 
maintenance, corrosive climate, etc., as well as any other information not covered on this form that may be pertinent to the study.  If historic logs 






Oil change (or fluid analysis)
Check electrical tightness
Engine intensive maintenance
Generator (electrical) intensive maintenance
Check air filter
Check alarms
Check switch & breaker positions
Visual inspection for leaking fluids




Battery resistance or impedance test
Clean unit exterior (including radiator & louvers)
Fuel cleaning (or fluid analysis)
Generator set no-load test
Generator set load test on load bank
Form Version 9DEC13
Generator set load test on operational load
"Dead bus" operational load test



























DESCRIPTION OF FAILURE Briefly describe what failed.  Expand this field if needed.  
You do not need to report  corrective maintenance (repairs) discovered early and repaired 
to prevent a failure from occuring; this section should be used to list events that actually 
resulted in a failure to start or failure while running.  For failures while running, please 
include how long the genset was running prior to failure.  If details of the failure are 
























COX REGRESSION TIME ANALYSIS, x16 FULL TIME-DEPENDENT MODEL 
The following output is from R during analysis of the data set by time (t) and operational 
failure events (Fov). The predictors are as defined in Table 1. This utilized data set “g41r” which 
represents the final data set reduced by the removal of units that lacked run-hour chronometers. 
Time at start (T2s), was used to represent time at the start of the observation period and was set as 
T2s = 0 for all observations. T2ey represents time (in years) accumulated during each observation 
period as T2ey = (Tfv - Tsv)/365. This model was the culmination of the bidirectional stepwise 
regression process described in Chapter 4 and represents the final non-parametric model. Plots 
for this model are shown in Figure 15 through Figure 19. 
 





coxreg(formula = Surv(T2s, T2ey, Fov) ~ log(Tagey) + log(Trtfv) +  
    x16, data = g41r) 
 
Covariate           Mean       Coef     Rel.Risk   S.E.    Wald p 
log(Tagey)          2.499    -1.476     0.229     0.344     0.000  
log(Trtfv)          5.888     0.700     2.014     0.258     0.007  
x16                 6.273     0.240     1.271     0.121     0.047  
 
Events                    58  
Total time at risk        1281.3  
Max. log. likelihood      -269.94  
LR test statistic         24.2  
Degrees of freedom        3  
Overall p-value           2.27095e-05 
 
> cox.zph(fit) 
               rho  chisq     p 
log(Tagey) -0.1099 0.7528 0.386 
log(Trtfv)  0.0412 0.0907 0.763 
x16        -0.0837 0.4160 0.519 













Figure 15.  Survival fit of full model regression by time in standby service, h(t). 
 
 
Figure 16.  Martingale residuals of full model regression fit by time in standby service, h(t). 












































Figure 17.  Schoenfeld residuals of cox.zph fit test for log(Tage), full model by time 
 
 













COX REGRESSION RUN HOURS ANALYSIS, x16 FULL TIME DEPENDENT MODEL 
The following output is from R during analysis of the data set by run hours (Trt), and all 
operational failure events (Fov). This utilized data set “g41r” which represents the final data set 
reduced by the removal of units that lacked run-hour chronometers. Time at start (T2s), was used 
to represent run hours at the start of the observation period and was set as T2s=0 for all 
observations. T3e represents the run hours accumulated during each observation period as 
T3e=Trtfv-Trtsv. This model was the culmination of the bidirectional stepwise regression process 
described in Chapter 4. As no covariates were significant in this model and the log likelihood of 
this model strength weak compared to the model by time, this model was dropped from the 
analysis. The survival fit is shown in Figure 20. 
 





coxreg(formula = Surv(T2s, T3e, Fov) ~ log(Tagey) + log(Trtfv) +  
    x16, data = g41r) 
 
Covariate           Mean       Coef     Rel.Risk   S.E.    Wald p 
log(Tagey)          2.458    -0.240     0.787     0.324     0.460  
log(Trtfv)          6.098    -0.396     0.673     0.293     0.176  
x16                 6.342     0.155     1.168     0.118     0.187  
 
Events                    58  
Total time at risk         40151  
Max. log. likelihood        -265  
LR test statistic         13.5  
Degrees of freedom        3  
Overall p-value           0.00365329 
 
> cox.zph(fit) 
               rho chisq      p 
log(Tagey)  0.0808 0.357 0.5499 
log(Trtfv) -0.1779 2.255 0.1332 
x16        -0.2524 3.800 0.0512 
GLOBAL          NA 5.849 0.1192 
 
> plot(survfit(fit),ylab="prob(Survival)",xlab="Run Hours") 










Figure 20.  Survival fit of full model regression by run hours, h(Trt) 
  



























COX REGRESSION TIME ANALYSIS, x16 SIMPLIFIED MODEL 
The following output is from R during analysis of the data set by time (t) and all failure 
events (Fv). The predictors are as defined in Table 1. This utilized data set “g41r” which 
represents the final data set reduced by the removal of units that lacked run-hour chronometers. 
Time at start (T2s), was used to represent time at the start of the observation period and was set as 
T2s = 0 for all observations. T2ey represents time (in years) accumulated during each observation 
period as T2ey = (Tfv - Tsv)/365. This model removed the time dependent Weibull predictors from 
the full model. Plots for this model are shown in Figure 21 through Figure 23. 
 




coxreg(formula = Surv(T2s, T2ey, Fov) ~ x16, data = g41r) 
 
Covariate           Mean       Coef     Rel.Risk   S.E.    Wald p 
x16                 6.273     0.199     1.220     0.115     0.084  
 
Events                    58  
Total time at risk        1281.3  
Max. log. likelihood      -279.75  
LR test statistic         4.57  
Degrees of freedom        1  
Overall p-value           0.0325215 
 
> cox.zph(fit.x16.c) 
     rho chisq     p 
x16 -0.1 0.541 0.462 
 










Figure 21. Survival fit of simplified model regression by time in standby service, h(t) 
 
 














COX REGRESSION RUN HOURS ANALYSIS, x16 SIMPLIFIED MODEL 
The following output is from R during analysis of the data set by run hours (Trt), and all 
operational failure events (Fov). This utilized data set “g41r” which represents the final data set 
reduced by the removal of units that lacked run-hour chronometers. Time at start (T2s), was used 
to represent run hours at the start of the observation period and was set as T2s=0 for all 
observations. T3e represents the run hours accumulated during each observation period as 
T3e=Trtfv-Trtsv. This model removed the time dependent Weibull predictors from the full model. 
Plots are shown in Figure 24 through Figure 26. 
 




coxreg(formula = Surv(T2s, T3e, Fov) ~ x16, data = g41r) 
 
Covariate           Mean       Coef     Rel.Risk   S.E.    Wald p 
x16                 6.342     0.200     1.221     0.117     0.087  
 
Events                    58  
Total time at risk         40151  
Max. log. likelihood      -269.54  
LR test statistic         4.43  
Degrees of freedom        1  
Overall p-value           0.0353569 
 
> cox.zph(fit.x16.c) 
       rho chisq      p 
x16 -0.227  2.92 0.0876 
 










Figure 24. Survival Fit of simplified model regression by run hours, h(t) 
 
 













COX REGRESSION TIME ANALYSIS, INTERIM TIME-DEPENDENT MODELS 
The following output is from R during analysis of the data set by time (t) and all 
operational failure events (Fov). The predictors are as defined in Table 1. This utilized data set 
“g41r” which represents the final data set reduced by the removal of units that lacked run-hour 
chronometers. Time at start (T2s), was used to represent time at the start of the observation period 
and was set as T2s = 0 for all observations. T2ey represents time (in years) accumulated during 
each observation period as T2ey = (Tfv - Tsv)/365. The interim models in this section show models 
with combinations of the predictors with the highest statistical significance in model 
development,  x12, x16, xL and src. 
Alone in combination with log(Tage) and log(Trtfv), x12, x16, xL and src all yield highly 
significant results. 
 
> coxph(Surv(T2s, T2ey, Fov) ~ log(Tagey) + log(Trtfv) + x12, data = g41r) 
Call: 
coxph(formula = Surv(T2s, T2ey, Fov) ~ log(Tagey) + log(Trtfv) +  
    x12, data = g41r) 
 
             coef exp(coef) se(coef)     z       p 
log(Tagey) -1.479     0.228    0.345 -4.29 1.8e-05 
log(Trtfv)  0.703     2.020    0.258  2.72  0.0065 
x12         0.217     1.242    0.110  1.97  0.0484 
 
Likelihood ratio test=23.9  on 3 df, p=2.58e-05 
n= 299, number of events= 58  
 
> coxph(Surv(T2s, T2ey, Fov) ~ log(Tagey) + log(Trtfv) + x16, data = g41r) 
Call: 
coxph(formula = Surv(T2s, T2ey, Fov) ~ log(Tagey) + log(Trtfv) +  
    x16, data = g41r) 
 
             coef exp(coef) se(coef)     z       p 
log(Tagey) -1.476     0.229    0.344 -4.29 1.8e-05 
log(Trtfv)  0.700     2.014    0.258  2.71  0.0067 
x16         0.240     1.271    0.121  1.99  0.0469 
 
Likelihood ratio test=24.2  on 3 df, p=2.27e-05 
n= 299, number of events= 58  
 






coxph(formula = Surv(T2s, T2ey, Fov) ~ log(Tagey) + log(Trtfv) +  
    xl, data = g41r) 
 
               coef exp(coef) se(coef)     z       p 
log(Tagey) -1.53743   0.21493  0.35433 -4.34 1.4e-05 
log(Trtfv)  0.74718   2.11103  0.26519  2.82  0.0048 
xl         -6.02614   0.00241  3.22697 -1.87  0.0618 
 
Likelihood ratio test=25.8  on 3 df, p=1.05e-05 
n= 299, number of events= 58  
 
> coxph(Surv(T2s, T2ey, Fov) ~ log(Tagey) + log(Trtfv) + src, data = g41r) 
Call: 
coxph(formula = Surv(T2s, T2ey, Fov) ~ log(Tagey) + log(Trtfv) +  
    src, data = g41r) 
 
             coef exp(coef) se(coef)     z       p 
log(Tagey) -1.494     0.224    0.347 -4.31 1.7e-05 
log(Trtfv)  0.708     2.031    0.261  2.72  0.0066 
srcB        1.537     4.651    0.744  2.07  0.0389 
 
Likelihood ratio test=24.6  on 3 df, p=1.84e-05 
n= 299, number of events= 58  
 
When placed in combination, x12, x16, xL and src all lost statistical significance and the 
model significance worsened. There were no models where two or more of these predictors 
remain significant together. The opposite coefficients in these paired models suggest conflation 
is impacting the regression results.   
 
> coxph(Surv(T2s, T2ey, Fov) ~ log(Tagey) + log(Trtfv) + x12 + x16 + xl + src
, data = g41r) 
Call: 
coxph(formula = Surv(T2s, T2ey, Fov) ~ log(Tagey) + log(Trtfv) +  
    x12 + x16 + xl + src, data = g41r) 
 
                coef exp(coef)  se(coef)     z     p 
log(Tagey) -1.47e+00  2.30e-01  3.57e-01 -4.11 4e-05 
log(Trtfv)  6.94e-01  2.00e+00  2.73e-01  2.54 0.011 
x12        -4.04e+01  2.74e-18  1.43e+04  0.00 0.998 
x16         4.17e+01  1.23e+18  1.27e+04  0.00 0.997 
xl         -5.85e+00  2.88e-03  4.25e+00 -1.38 0.169 
srcB        2.26e+01  6.57e+09  9.19e+04  0.00 1.000 
 
Likelihood ratio test=29.1  on 6 df, p=5.94e-05 
n= 299, number of events= 58  
Warning message: 
In fitter(X, Y, strats, offset, init, control, weights = weights,  : 






> coxph(Surv(T2s, T2ey, Fov) ~ log(Tagey) + log(Trtfv) + x12 + x16, data = g4
1r) 
Call: 
coxph(formula = Surv(T2s, T2ey, Fov) ~ log(Tagey) + log(Trtfv) +  
    x12 + x16, data = g41r) 
 
                coef exp(coef)  se(coef)     z       p 
log(Tagey) -1.39e+00  2.48e-01  3.47e-01 -4.02 5.9e-05 
log(Trtfv)  6.23e-01  1.86e+00  2.63e-01  2.36   0.018 
x12        -4.29e+01  2.36e-19  1.19e+04  0.00   0.997 
x16         4.84e+01  1.03e+21  1.34e+04  0.00   0.997 
 
Likelihood ratio test=26.3  on 4 df, p=2.76e-05 
n= 299, number of events= 58  
Warning message: 
In fitter(X, Y, strats, offset, init, control, weights = weights,  : 
  Loglik converged before variable  3,4 ; beta may be infinite.  
 
> coxph(Surv(T2s, T2ey, Fov) ~ log(Tagey) + log(Trtfv) + x16 + xl, data = g41
r) 
Call: 
coxph(formula = Surv(T2s, T2ey, Fov) ~ log(Tagey) + log(Trtfv) +  
    x16 + xl, data = g41r) 
 
               coef exp(coef) se(coef)     z       p 
log(Tagey) -1.53516   0.21542  0.35320 -4.35 1.4e-05 
log(Trtfv)  0.75149   2.12016  0.26532  2.83  0.0046 
x16         0.07402   1.07682  0.14233  0.52  0.6030 
xl         -4.86990   0.00767  3.84834 -1.27  0.2057 
 
Likelihood ratio test=26.1  on 4 df, p=3e-05 
n= 299, number of events= 58  
 
> coxph(Surv(T2s, T2ey, Fov) ~ log(Tagey) + log(Trtfv) + x16 + src, data = g4
1r) 
Call: 
coxph(formula = Surv(T2s, T2ey, Fov) ~ log(Tagey) + log(Trtfv) +  
    x16 + src, data = g41r) 
 
               coef exp(coef) se(coef)     z       p 
log(Tagey) -1.49375   0.22453  0.34708 -4.30 1.7e-05 
log(Trtfv)  0.70838   2.03070  0.26063  2.72  0.0066 
x16         0.00979   1.00984  0.46795  0.02  0.9833 
srcB        1.47827   4.38535  2.90636  0.51  0.6110 
 
Likelihood ratio test=24.6  on 4 df, p=5.96e-05 
n= 299, number of events= 58  
 
> coxph(Surv(T2s, T2ey, Fov) ~ log(Tagey) + log(Trtfv) + x12 + xl, data = g41
r) 
Call: 
coxph(formula = Surv(T2s, T2ey, Fov) ~ log(Tagey) + log(Trtfv) +  






               coef exp(coef) se(coef)     z       p 
log(Tagey) -1.53675   0.21508  0.35335 -4.35 1.4e-05 
log(Trtfv)  0.75194   2.12110  0.26534  2.83  0.0046 
x12         0.05786   1.05956  0.13056  0.44  0.6577 
xl         -5.04269   0.00646  3.85424 -1.31  0.1908 
 
Likelihood ratio test=26  on 4 df, p=3.13e-05 
n= 299, number of events= 58  
 
> coxph(Surv(T2s, T2ey, Fov) ~ log(Tagey) + log(Trtfv) + x12 + src, data = g4
1r) 
Call: 
coxph(formula = Surv(T2s, T2ey, Fov) ~ log(Tagey) + log(Trtfv) +  
    x12 + src, data = g41r) 
 
             coef exp(coef) se(coef)     z       p 
log(Tagey) -1.494     0.224    0.347 -4.31 1.7e-05 
log(Trtfv)  0.706     2.025    0.261  2.70  0.0069 
x12        -0.260     0.771    1.065 -0.24  0.8074 
srcB        3.260    26.047    7.228  0.45  0.6520 
 
Likelihood ratio test=24.8  on 4 df, p=5.66e-05 
n= 299, number of events= 58  
 
> coxph(Surv(T2s, T2ey, Fov) ~ log(Tagey) + log(Trtfv) + xl + src, data = g41
r) 
Call: 
coxph(formula = Surv(T2s, T2ey, Fov) ~ log(Tagey) + log(Trtfv) +  
    xl + src, data = g41r) 
 
               coef exp(coef) se(coef)     z       p 
log(Tagey) -1.53433   0.21560  0.35334 -4.34 1.4e-05 
log(Trtfv)  0.74907   2.11504  0.26569  2.82  0.0048 
xl         -4.69266   0.00916  4.06455 -1.15  0.2483 
srcB        0.48335   1.62150  0.94431  0.51  0.6088 
 
Likelihood ratio test=26.1  on 4 df, p=3.01e-05 
n= 299, number of events= 58  
 
 
Dataset g41r4 was created with a new Marque factor which sorted the myriad of makes 
and models cluttering the original Make factor into nine specific marques, Caterpillar, Cummins, 
Onan, MTU, Empire, Generac, SDMO, Olympian, and Kohler. Dataset g41r5 reduced this 
further by incorporating Onan into the Cummins parent brand and Olympian into the Caterpillar 






> coxph(Surv(T2s, T2ey, Fov) ~ log(Tagey) + log(Trtfv) + x16 + Marque, data = 
g41r4) 
Call: 
coxph(formula = Surv(T2s, T2ey, Fov) ~ log(Tagey) + log(Trtfv) +  
    x16 + Marque, data = g41r4) 
 
                    coef exp(coef)  se(coef)     z       p 
log(Tagey)     -1.65e+00  1.91e-01  3.51e-01 -4.71 2.4e-06 
log(Trtfv)      6.10e-01  1.84e+00  2.70e-01  2.26   0.024 
x16             1.87e-01  1.21e+00  1.28e-01  1.46   0.144 
MarqueCummins   7.70e-01  2.16e+00  6.36e-01  1.21   0.226 
MarqueEmpire   -1.36e+01  1.25e-06  2.62e+03 -0.01   0.996 
MarqueGenerac   1.18e-01  1.12e+00  6.32e-01  0.19   0.852 
MarqueKohler    4.06e-01  1.50e+00  6.51e-01  0.62   0.533 
MarqueMTU      -6.39e-01  5.28e-01  8.05e-01 -0.79   0.427 
MarqueOlympian  1.16e+00  3.18e+00  6.50e-01  1.78   0.075 
MarqueOnan      1.14e+00  3.12e+00  6.59e-01  1.73   0.085 
MarqueSDMO      9.48e-02  1.10e+00  9.23e-01  0.10   0.918 
 
Likelihood ratio test=38.9  on 11 df, p=5.43e-05 
n= 299, number of events= 58  
Warning message: 
In fitter(X, Y, strats, offset, init, control, weights = weights,  : 
  Loglik converged before variable  5 ; beta may be infinite.  
 
> coxph(Surv(T2s, T2ey, Fov) ~ log(Tagey) + log(Trtfv) + x16 + Marque, data = 
g41r5) 
Call: 
coxph(formula = Surv(T2s, T2ey, Fov) ~ log(Tagey) + log(Trtfv) +  
    x16 + Marque, data = g41r5) 
 
                   coef exp(coef)  se(coef)     z       p 
log(Tagey)    -1.51e+00  2.21e-01  3.41e-01 -4.43 9.5e-06 
log(Trtfv)     5.76e-01  1.78e+00  2.63e-01  2.19   0.029 
x16            2.68e-01  1.31e+00  1.22e-01  2.19   0.028 
MarqueCummins  2.10e-01  1.23e+00  3.65e-01  0.58   0.564 
MarqueEmpire  -1.44e+01  5.74e-07  2.60e+03 -0.01   0.996 
MarqueGenerac -5.80e-01  5.60e-01  4.11e-01 -1.41   0.158 
MarqueKohler  -3.21e-01  7.25e-01  4.54e-01 -0.71   0.479 
MarqueMTU     -1.36e+00  2.57e-01  6.47e-01 -2.10   0.036 
MarqueSDMO    -6.04e-01  5.46e-01  7.85e-01 -0.77   0.442 
 
Likelihood ratio test=34.9  on 9 df, p=6.1e-05 
n= 299, number of events= 58  
Warning message: 
In fitter(X, Y, strats, offset, init, control, weights = weights,  : 







PARAMETRIC MODEL SPREADSHEET REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
The parametric model could not be analyzed by the R function phreg due to the different 
time dependencies required for predictor coefficient calculations and final model fitting. The 
parametric model was instead developed by piecewise constant hazard regression in Microsoft 
Excel. 
 The final parametric model below was developed by separating the sample population 
into two stratified subpopulations, one with x16 = 7 and one with x16 ≤ 1. Different values of λ 
were selected until the difference between the weighted reliability mean of the model matched 
the sample reliability from the data. The mean value of x16 = 0.45 for the x16 ≤ 1 subpopulation 
was used to represent x16 for the x16 ≤ 1 subpopulation. The histogram field was used for 
weighting the mean and represents the number of observations of generator sets of that age 
included in the sample population data set. 
 
The piecewise constant hazard model spreadsheet equations used were as follows, with T 
representing the age of the generator set from T = 1 to 43 years, the oldest set in the sample 
population. The calculated values are shown in Table 8 and Table 9. 
 
h(t) = $B7*EXP($C7+$D7+$E7) = λe-1.476log(T) + .7log(31.2T) + 0.1044 [or 1.624 for x16=7]  
f(t) = I7*L6 = h(t)S(t-1) 
F(t) = K6+J7 = f(t) + F(t-1) 
S(t) = EXP(-K7) = e-F(t) 






Table 8. Model Parameter Calculations From the Spreadsheet Regression for x16 ≤ 1 
  
x16<=1 h(t) f(t) F(t) S(t) R(t)
t(years) x16 ≤ 1 PDF CDF Surv Rel Histogram
1 0.023061915 0.023062 0.023062 0.977202 0.977202 6
2 0.018257634 0.017841 0.040903 0.959922 0.981908 7
3 0.015925737 0.015287 0.056191 0.945359 0.9842 8
4 0.014454185 0.013664 0.069855 0.932529 0.98565 11
5 0.013407065 0.012502 0.082358 0.920943 0.986682 7
6 0.012608071 0.011611 0.093969 0.910311 0.987471 10
7 0.011969796 0.010896 0.104865 0.900446 0.988102 10
8 0.011443075 0.010304 0.115169 0.891215 0.988622 10
9 0.010997746 0.009801 0.12497 0.882523 0.989063 10
10 0.010614092 0.009367 0.134338 0.874295 0.989442 6
11 0.010278577 0.008987 0.143324 0.866473 0.989774 4
12 0.009981545 0.008649 0.151973 0.859012 0.990068 4
13 0.009715888 0.008346 0.160319 0.851872 0.990331 2
14 0.009476236 0.008073 0.168391 0.845023 0.990569 2
15 0.009258442 0.007824 0.176215 0.838438 0.990784 5
16 0.009059242 0.007596 0.183811 0.832093 0.990982 9
17 0.008876028 0.007386 0.191196 0.82597 0.991163 7
18 0.008706685 0.007191 0.198388 0.820052 0.991331 8
19 0.008549474 0.007011 0.205399 0.814322 0.991487 8
20 0.008402954 0.006843 0.212242 0.808769 0.991632 9
21 0.008265915 0.006685 0.218927 0.803381 0.991768 9
22 0.008137334 0.006537 0.225464 0.798146 0.991896 0
23 0.008016338 0.006398 0.231862 0.793055 0.992016 0
24 0.00790218 0.006267 0.238129 0.788101 0.992129 1
25 0.00779421 0.006143 0.244272 0.783275 0.992236 1
26 0.007691865 0.006025 0.250297 0.77857 0.992338 1
27 0.007594652 0.005913 0.25621 0.77398 0.992434 1
28 0.007502137 0.005807 0.262016 0.769499 0.992526 0
29 0.007413938 0.005705 0.267721 0.765121 0.992613 0
30 0.007329714 0.005608 0.273329 0.760842 0.992697 0
31 0.007249162 0.005515 0.278845 0.756657 0.992777 0
32 0.007172012 0.005427 0.284271 0.752562 0.992854 3
33 0.007098019 0.005342 0.289613 0.748553 0.992927 3
34 0.007026965 0.00526 0.294873 0.744626 0.992998 3
35 0.006958652 0.005182 0.300055 0.740778 0.993066 3
36 0.006892899 0.005106 0.305161 0.737005 0.993131 3
37 0.006829545 0.005033 0.310194 0.733304 0.993194 3
38 0.006768439 0.004963 0.315158 0.729674 0.993254 3
39 0.006709446 0.004896 0.320053 0.72611 0.993313 3
40 0.006652442 0.00483 0.324884 0.722611 0.99337 0
41 0.006597312 0.004767 0.329651 0.719175 0.993424 0
42 0.006543951 0.004706 0.334357 0.715798 0.993477 0





Table 9. Model Parameter Calculations From the Spreadsheet Regression for x16 =7. 
 
x16 =7 h(t) f(t) F(t) S(t) R(t)
t(years) x16 = 7 PDF CDF Surv Rel Histogram
1 0.1054021 0.105402 0.105402 0.899963 0.899963 45
2 0.083444629 0.075097 0.180499 0.834853 0.919942 76
3 0.072786935 0.060766 0.241266 0.785633 0.929799 84
4 0.06606136 0.0519 0.293166 0.745899 0.936073 99
5 0.061275607 0.045705 0.338871 0.712574 0.940564 98
6 0.057623887 0.041061 0.379932 0.683908 0.944005 95
7 0.054706716 0.037414 0.417347 0.658793 0.946763 97
8 0.052299391 0.034454 0.451801 0.636481 0.949045 82
9 0.050264063 0.031992 0.483793 0.616441 0.950978 75
10 0.048510611 0.029904 0.513697 0.59828 0.952647 66
11 0.046977175 0.028105 0.541803 0.581699 0.954109 60
12 0.045619621 0.026537 0.568339 0.566465 0.955405 55
13 0.044405464 0.025154 0.593494 0.552394 0.956566 46
14 0.043310158 0.023924 0.617418 0.539335 0.957614 37
15 0.042314751 0.022822 0.64024 0.527166 0.958568 35
16 0.04140433 0.021827 0.662067 0.515784 0.959441 32
17 0.04056697 0.020924 0.68299 0.505104 0.960245 34
18 0.039793003 0.0201 0.70309 0.495053 0.960988 31
19 0.039074488 0.019344 0.722434 0.485569 0.961679 31
20 0.038404832 0.018648 0.741082 0.476598 0.962323 28
21 0.037778509 0.018005 0.759087 0.468093 0.962926 20
22 0.037190843 0.017409 0.776496 0.460015 0.963492 20
23 0.036637846 0.016854 0.79335 0.452327 0.964025 14
24 0.036116096 0.016336 0.809686 0.444998 0.964528 13
25 0.03562263 0.015852 0.825538 0.437999 0.965004 13
26 0.035154873 0.015398 0.840936 0.431307 0.965456 11
27 0.034710571 0.014971 0.855907 0.424898 0.965885 11
28 0.034287743 0.014569 0.870476 0.418752 0.966293 11
29 0.033884637 0.014189 0.884665 0.412852 0.966683 9
30 0.0334997 0.01383 0.898496 0.407182 0.967055 8
31 0.033131546 0.013491 0.911986 0.401726 0.967411 7
32 0.032778938 0.013168 0.925154 0.39647 0.967752 7
33 0.032440763 0.012862 0.938016 0.391404 0.96808 4
34 0.032116018 0.01257 0.950586 0.386514 0.968394 4
35 0.031803799 0.012293 0.962879 0.381792 0.968697 3
36 0.031503285 0.012028 0.974907 0.377228 0.968988 2
37 0.031213729 0.011775 0.986681 0.372812 0.969268 2
38 0.030934451 0.011533 0.998214 0.368537 0.969539 2
39 0.030664831 0.011301 1.009515 0.364396 0.969801 2
40 0.030404299 0.011079 1.020594 0.360381 0.970053 2
41 0.030152333 0.010866 1.031461 0.356486 0.970298 1
42 0.029908452 0.010662 1.042123 0.352705 0.970534 1






The weighted reliability of each subpopulation was calculated by the equation below, 







 This was compared to the observed sample reliability, calculated as Rdata = e
-1/MTBF, 
where MTBF = Total Time / Number of Failures for the sample population. 
  
For x16 ≤ 1, MTBF = 143.77 / 2 = 71.88 years 
For x16 = 7, MTBF = 1137.45 / 56 = 20.3116 years 
 
 A value of λ = 0.00696 resulted in the smallest net difference between the model and data 
reliability figures. 
 
ℎ(𝑡) = 0.00696𝑒0.240𝑥16−1.476 log(𝑡)+.700log⁡(31.2𝑡) 
 
For x16 ≤ 1, Rdata = 0.95305, Rmodel = 0.94703 






SIMPLIFIED PARAMETRIC REGRESSION MODEL ANALYSIS 
A simplified time-independent parametric regression model fitted to an exponential 
survival distribution using x16 as the only predictor was developed. The following output is from 
R during analysis of the data set using the phreg function in R. The predictors are as defined in 
Table 1. This utilized data set “g41r” which represents the final data set reduced by the removal 
of units that lacked run-hour chronometers. Time at start (T2s), was used to represent time at the 
start of the observation period and was set as T2s = 0 for all observations. T2ey represents time (in 
years) accumulated during each observation period as T2ey = (Tfv - Tsv)/365.   
The p = 0.94 value calculated for the fixed shape exponential distribution by phreg 
appears to be in error as phreg is comparing the log likelihood to a test statistic of 0. The p-value 
calculated for the unrestricted Weibull distribution returns a shape nearly identical to the 
exponential function but a statistically significant value of p = 0.022. As the predictor β16 value 
(0.207 and 0.208 respectively), shape (1 and 0.962 respectively) and log likelihood values 
(-234.98 and -234.91 respectively) for these two functions are nearly identical, the p-value for 
the exponential model should also be very close to p = 0.022. 
The plots of these functions are shown in Figure 11 and Figure 12 in the Chapter IV. 
 
> fit.x16.c <- coxreg(Surv(T2s, T2ey, Fov) ~ x16, data = g41r) 
> fit.x16.c 
Call: 
coxreg(formula = Surv(T2s, T2ey, Fov) ~ x16, data = g41r) 
 
Covariate           Mean       Coef     Rel.Risk   S.E.    Wald p 
x16                 6.273     0.199     1.220     0.115     0.084  
 
Events                    58  
Total time at risk        1281.3  
Max. log. likelihood      -279.75  
LR test statistic         4.57  
Degrees of freedom        1  










phreg(formula = Surv(T2s, T2ey, Fov) ~ x16, data = g41r, dist = "weibull",  
    shape = 1) 
 
Covariate          W.mean      Coef Exp(Coef)  se(Coef)    Wald p 
x16                 6.273     0.207     1.230     0.115     0.072  
 
log(scale)                    4.456    86.165     0.792     0.000  
 
 Shape is fixed at  1  
 
Events                    58  
Total time at risk        1281.3  
Max. log. likelihood      -234.98  
LR test statistic         0  
Degrees of freedom        1  
Overall p-value           0.945997 
 
> fit.x16.w <- phreg(Surv(T2s, T2ey, Fov) ~ x16, data = g41r, dist="weibull") 
> fit.x16.w 
Call: 
phreg(formula = Surv(T2s, T2ey, Fov) ~ x16, data = g41r, dist = "weibull") 
 
Covariate          W.mean      Coef Exp(Coef)  se(Coef)    Wald p 
x16                 6.273     0.208     1.232     0.115     0.070  
 
log(scale)                    4.576    97.116     0.891     0.000  
log(shape)                   -0.040     0.961     0.109     0.717  
 
Events                    58  
Total time at risk        1281.3  
Max. log. likelihood      -234.91  
LR test statistic         5.17  
Degrees of freedom        1  
Overall p-value           0.0229996 
 
Using this model with the spreadsheet regression method returns the following: 
For x16 ≤ 1, Rdata = 0.98353, Rmodel = 0.98739 







Tables are provided for reliability based upon the model in Equation 18. Table 10 reflects 
typical values assuming an average of 31.2 hours annual run time, the average for the sample 
population in this study. Table 11 reflects units an average 100 hours annual run time. Generator 
sets receiving weekly no-load tests and bimonthly or quarterly maintenance visits are represented 
by the average intensity column. Generator sets receiving NFPA 110 (2016) recommended 
maintenance are represented by the high intensity column. Units well exceeding NFPA 110 
(2016) recommendations are represented by the extremely high intensity column. Reliability for 
specific generator set age, run hours, and maintenance intensity can be calculated using Equation 
18. Values of 0.08333, 1, and 7 were used respectively for average, high, and extremely high 
maintenance intensity. 
 










High High Average 
0 < t ≤ 5 0.985201 0.981593 0.924670 
5 < t ≤ 10 0.989952 0.987493 0.948271 
10 < t ≤ 15 0.991500 0.989419 0.956098 
15 < t ≤ 20 0.992390 0.990525 0.960616 
20 < t ≤ 25 0.992995 0.991278 0.963701 
25 < t ≤ 30 0.993445 0.991837 0.965998 
30 < t ≤ 35 0.993798 0.992277 0.967805 












High High Average 
0 < t ≤ 5 0.978981 0.973879 0.894474 
5 < t ≤ 10 0.985712 0.982227 0.927113 
10 < t ≤ 15 0.987910 0.984958 0.938033 
15 < t ≤ 20 0.989173 0.986527 0.944356 
20 < t ≤ 25 0.990033 0.987595 0.948679 
25 < t ≤ 30 0.990672 0.988389 0.951904 
30 < t ≤ 35 0.991173 0.989013 0.954441 





























































































































































Generator set no-load test
Generator set load test on load bank
Generator set load test on operational load
"Dead bus" operational load test
Check electrical tightness
Engine intensive maintenance
Generator (electrical) intensive maintenance
NFPA110 (2013) Test Frequency
Battery voltage & physical condition
Check fan belt(s)
Battery resistance or impedance test
Clean unit exterior (including radiator & louvers)
Fuel cleaning (or fluid analysis)
Oil change (or fluid analysis)
Visual inspection for leaking fluids





NFPA110 (2013) Maintenance Frequency
ROUTINE PREVENTATIVE MAINTENANCE
Check alarms
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